

# **BURMESE BORDER CONSORTIUM**

## **RELIEF PROGRAMME**

**January to June 2002**

Including

**Audit Report for Period July 2001 to June 2002**

and

**FUNDING APPEAL FOR 2003**

**August 2002**

# **BURMESE BORDER CONSORTIUM**

## **GOAL AND OBJECTIVES**

### **PREAMBLE**

The Burmese Border Consortium (BBC) is a consortium of humanitarian agencies developed from a consortium of Christian agencies (The Consortium of Christian Agencies) established in 1984 to provide basic food and relief supplies to 9,000 refugees from Burma along the Thailand/Burma border. The refugee population has increased considerably since that time and the BBC and other NGOs have expanded their programmes to meet their needs.

Members of the Consortium believe that all possible steps should be taken to prevent or alleviate human suffering arising out of conflict or calamity, and that civilians so affected have a right to protection and assistance. It is on the basis of this belief, reflected in international humanitarian law and based on principles of humanity, that the members of the BBC offer their services as humanitarian agencies. The BBC will act in accordance with the principles set out in the "Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations in Disaster relief (1994)"

### **GOAL**

To alleviate malnutrition and food insecurity brought about by the ongoing conflict in Burma and provide for the basic human needs of displaced persons along the Thailand/Burma border.

### **OBJECTIVES**

- To ensure that displaced persons from Burma receive adequate availability and access to food to sustain life.
- To ensure that the displaced have adequate shelter and basic commodities for survival.
- To minimise any adverse effects which the presence of refugees might have on Thai communities.

### **ACTIVITIES**

The specific activities that are undertaken to meet BBC programme objectives vary from year to year in response to the displaced situation and services provided by other organisations.

## **POLICIES AND GUIDING PHILOSOPHY**

### **NATURE OF ASSISTANCE**

- To ensure whenever possible the same level of support to all displaced persons regardless of location, ethnicity or religion.
- To provide assistance to the displaced comparable with, and not exceeding the living standards of local communities.
- To improve the availability, access and utilisation of food production capability wherever possible.

## **DELIVERY OF ASSISTANCE**

- To keep staff presence and relief assistance to a minimum in order to respect cultural identity, promote self-sufficiency and minimise aid-dependency.
- To provide assistance through representative refugee relief committees to ensure coordination, to avoid duplication and to enhance the capacity of community leadership structures.

## **COORDINATION**

- To provide assistance in cooperation with the Royal Thai Government and in accordance with the regulations of the Ministry of Interior (MOI).
- To coordinate activities with agencies that provide health and education assistance through the Committee for the Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand (CCSDPT) and to support these activities where appropriate.
- To work as a consortium to avoid competition and duplication of assistance between agencies and to maximise access to and use of all member resources.

## **GENDER AND EQUITY**

- To encourage the equal participation of men and women in the planning and delivery of the BBC assistance programme.
- To encourage the participation minority groups in the planning and delivery of the BBC assistance programme.

## **EVALUATION AND INDICATORS**

- To evaluate the programme periodically as a tool for improving the effectiveness of the programme and in accordance with donor requirements.
- To assess achievement of the programme goal and objectives using appropriate indicators. Where possible data will be used from appropriate sources such as nutritional information from the medical NGOs and, where necessary, BBC studies will be commissioned for this purpose.

## **PHASE-OUT**

- The BBC will assist the Royal Thai Government, Burmese authorities and International Organisations in the voluntary repatriation of refugees from Burma as appropriate and when the situation allows.
- The BBC will be dissolved when these aims and objectives become invalid because there is no longer a need for assistance along the Thailand/Burma border or when another organisation takes over the responsibilities of BBC.

## **RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS**

- The attainment of these goal and objectives might be influenced (positively or negatively) by external factors beyond BBC's control. The presence or absence of epidemics, for example, could have a dramatic effect on the nutritional status of the population. Similarly, the policy of the Royal Thai Government towards displaced persons will have an important effect on the accessibility and level of services that can be provided. Other important factors which may influence BBC's ability to achieve its goal and objectives are Donor commitment to funding the BBC programme, the number of new refugee arrivals, foreign exchange rates and the price of commodities supplied by the BBC each year.

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## 1. SUMMARY AND FUNDING APPEAL

This report describes the Burmese Border Consortium (BBC) Refugee Relief Programme during the first six months of 2002 and presents an appeal for **USD 17.3 million** for 2003.

The total BBC caseload of concern was 143,226 at the end of the June. 2002 has probably been the worst year since 1997 in terms of human rights abuses committed by the Burmese Army against civilians in the Thai/Burmese border States and Divisions. Forced labour, forced relocations, the torching of villages, destruction of food stores, theft of livestock and property, extra-judicial killings and rape, are all every day occurrences. Latest estimates suggest that at least 2,500 villages have been abandoned or forcibly relocated since 1996, at least 400,000 people are now living in relocation sites and another 300,000 are in hiding or on the run. Refugees continue to flee these abuses and have now been arriving in Thailand at an average rate of around 900 per month for over three years.

Thai policy is that there should be no more refugees and the Provincial Admissions Boards (PABs) are no longer being convened. UNHCR statistics show that, as of 30<sup>th</sup> June, 32,409 refugees had sought admission to Thailand since May 1999, of whom the only 11,721 (36%) were accepted by the PABs. The other 19,665 had either been rejected by the PABs or had yet even to be considered. Most of these new arrivals are still in the camps but as of March 2002 the Ministry of Interior instructed that only the official registered caseload should receive assistance.

In 2002, BBC expenditures will be close to budget at around baht 516 million, a 14% increase on 2001 levels. This is the combined result of increasing refugee numbers, rising rice prices, increasing inputs because of growing refugee aid-dependency, and increased staffing to handle the growing programme and demands of donors for more monitoring and accountability. But the results presented by the performance indicators in Section 4 show that BBC is meeting its main goal and objectives with a remarkably high level of accountability shown by the refugee committees who implement the programme. Even with a record 25 staff, administrative costs are still less than 6% of the budget. The cost of the programme remains around only 26 US cents/refugee per day.

For 2003 BBC is projecting a budget of baht 727 million, a 30% increase over 2002. This large increase is partly due to the same factors as this year. Increasing refugee numbers, rice prices and staffing levels continue to push expenditures up, but next year BBC must respond both to the results of the nutrition survey and to a new priority, which is to reduce the need for refugees to leave the camps. Nutrition surveys have now been conducted in five camps and the results consistently show nutritional imbalances and dietary micronutrient deficiencies. The refugees are much more dependent on BBC rations than was previously assumed and have very limited ability to supplement the basic food basket themselves. The proposed solution is to introduce blended foods with some reduction in other food basket items. This is a relatively expensive, but comprehensive solution, and one which the World Food Programme now promotes for populations dependent on food aid.

The issue of refugees leaving the camps has become a major protection concern because this makes them vulnerable to arrest and physical abuse and because it aggravates already strained relations with Thai authorities and communities. Implementation of the 2000 Cooking fuel study has reduced (but not eliminated) the need to look for firewood and upgrading the food basket will reduce (but also not eliminate) the need for foraging or seeking work outside the camps. For 2003, BBC is also planning to give adequate building materials for the repair and maintenance of camp buildings so that refugees do not have to leave the camps in search of these items.

It will be difficult to raise this budget of USD 17.3 million, especially when Donors are anticipating new opportunities to provide humanitarian assistance inside Burma as a result of the dialogue between SPDC and the political opposition. But progress is painfully slow and even the optimists do not expect any major breakthrough on the complex ethnic issue in the foreseeable future. It seems inevitable that refugee numbers will go on increasing in the short term and that the conflict areas on the Thai/Burmese border will remain inaccessible from inside Burma. There are no options but to continue to provide for the basic humanitarian needs of the refugees in Thailand and to ensure that reasonable minimum standards of assistance are achieved.

The reality is that the BBC programme has been extremely good value during the last three years, because unusually low rice prices and a very favourable Thai baht exchange rate have masked increasing programme costs. Historically a 30% increase in costs per annum has not been uncommon. Unfortunately rice prices could well rise further and the baht is extraordinarily volatile at the present time. If rice prices and the exchange rate were to return even to levels experienced in 1998/9, the budget would further increase to over USD 20 million.

The 2002 Advisory Committee suggested that BBC should prioritise expenditures in the event that Donors cannot meet the required budget for 2003. Since BBC is only meeting basic needs any cuts in expenditures can only be at the expense of cutting out beneficiaries or by giving substandard rations. Neither of these are 'acceptable' options. BBC is grateful to all Donors for many years of faithful and understanding support, and on behalf of the border population urges all to respond yet again to this latest challenge for what continues to be a long term complex emergency situation.

## **2. REFUGEE SITUATION DURING THE FIRST HALF OF 2002**

The total refugee caseload of concern to BBC increased from 138,117 at the beginning of the year to 143,226 at the end of June. The rate of increase has now been more or less constant for over three years. This figure includes 12,539 estimated to be living in the Mon resettlement sites last November. Since then some residents have left these sites because of the activities of the breakaway Hongsawatoj Restoration Party but most of these are believed still to be living in the border area.

The map on the facing page shows camp population changes during the period. This map is different in two ways from those presented in previous BBC reports. Firstly, the camps have been categorised by location (Thai Province) rather than by ethnicity as before. This is because it was felt that by labelling camps 'Karen' or 'Karenni' the existence of many other smaller ethnic groups were hidden. The map shows the state of origin of the registered population as provided by UNHCR. Secondly, the map also shows the official registered camp populations as provided by the Ministry of Interior (MOI). This population represents an updated record of all cases approved by the Provincial Admissions Boards but does not include rejected cases or new asylum seekers awaiting status determination. In March, the MOI informed BBC that the official registration figure should be used as the basis for all requests to deliver assistance.

### **a) New Arrivals**

New refugees continue to come into Thailand because the situation across the border continues to get worse. Reports this year suggest that this has been the worst year for human rights abuses and destruction by the Burmese Army since 1997. Forced relocations, forced labour, the torching of villages, destruction of food stores and crops, theft of livestock and property, extra-judicial killings, rape, are all every day occurrences affecting hundreds of thousands of people.

Year by year it becomes increasingly difficult for refugees to flee Burma because of increased Burmese Army presence and control in the border areas and tighter surveillance by the Thai authorities. The Thai policy of not allowing any increase in camp populations also acts as a deterrence to would-be asylum seekers. The fact that nearly 1,000 new refugees continue to arrive in the camps every month is therefore indicative of how desperately bad the situation in Burma is, and the lack of any alternatives these people have. To escape, refugees tend to split up and arrive in small numbers to avoid SPDC patrols and the attention of the Thai Authorities. And when they do arrive, many do not register themselves for fear of being sent back. The real number of new arrivals is therefore likely to have been higher than that recorded, with unknown numbers hiding out in the camps or moving deeper into Thailand.

### **b) Admissions to Asylum**

The official admissions procedures set up after UNHCR was given a role on the border in 1998 have now effectively broken down. Since the second half of 2000 the Provincial Admissions Boards (PABs) were in any case rejecting almost all new arrivals on the grounds that they were not 'fleeing from fighting', but during 2002 the PABs have stopped meeting. This means that there is an ever-increasing caseload of new arrivals in the camps for which no determination has been made. According to UNHCR's statistics, 32,409 persons have now (June 30<sup>th</sup> 2002) sought admission to Thailand since the MOI/UNHCR headcount/registration was carried out in May 1999 (37 months = 876 per month). Of these, 11,721 have been accepted (36%) by the PABs, 10,408 have been rejected (32%) and 9,257 (29%) have yet to be considered. The number of repatriated refugees remains at 330.

It is understandable that the Thai authorities do not wish to see any increase in the refugee population and it is to their credit that during this period there were no more forced repatriations of new arrivals or rejected refugees. There is however an urgent need to address the issue of a growing unregistered camp population. These people are not officially entitled to food and other relief services and, as their numbers continue to grow, the situation will become unsustainable. Already some refugees suffer because they are too afraid to show themselves, many live in crowded conditions because they are not allowed to build their own houses and yet others put their lives at risk by trying to hang on in Burma because they fear a hostile reception in Thailand. Some opening up or new form of registration is urgently needed.

### **c) Thailand/Burma Relationships**

Relationships between the Thai government and SPDC continue to seesaw. After a period of comparatively warm relations during which the repatriation of refugees and migrant workers was broached, trust collapsed again following more fighting on the northern Shan border.

**Map-June 2002**

The current flare-up began around 20<sup>th</sup> May when the Shan State Army (SSA) took several SPDC/United Wa State Party (UWSP) bases near the border in fierce fighting. At the time the Thai Army had a large deployment of soldiers and equipment in the area on exercise. Reports claimed that the Thai Army had taken part in these attacks which targeted drug trafficking operations. Furthermore it was reported that during his visit to Thailand in April, the Chief of the Burmese Army, General Maung Aye, had given the go-ahead for the Thai Army to attack the Wa drug producers. The response from Rangoon however was one of outrage and SPDC immediately closed all border trading gates. They also launched a war of words, calling the Thai leaders liars and writing nationalistic articles in the Burmese Newspapers derogatory of the Thai monarchy and history.

The Thai Army was ordered to cease the military exercises and not to 'over react' to any spill-over of fighting between the SSA and SPDC/UWSP, a response condemned by some Thai Army leaders and some sections of the Thai public. The debate continues. SPDC has refused to discuss the issue and have failed to turn up at events/meetings they were invited to in Thailand. The border remains closed and some Thai journalists have been blacklisted by SPDC. The Thai authorities appear to be re-appraising their strategy and during July the National Security Council has indicated restricted access for journalists and NGOs to border areas to reduce tensions with Burma. So far this has had no affect on the relief programmes run by NGOs working under agreement with the MOI.

#### **d) Shan Refugees**

These events have brought more than usual attention to the unofficial Shan refugee situation. There are now three categories of Shan refugees:

- 1) SLORC forcibly relocated over 300,000 villagers in Central Shan States in 1996/7/8 and since then there has been a steady flow of refugees into Thailand. Well over 120,000 Shan refugees have been recorded, most of whom settle in the farms and orchards of the border provinces of Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai and Mae Hong Son. The average this year has been around 1,200 arriving in Fang District alone each month.
- 2) In April, the Lahu National Development Organisation produced a report documenting the relocation of mainly Wa people from northern Shan State to the Thai border area opposite Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai provinces since 1999. The report estimated that 126,000 people have been relocated so far, occupying Shan land and displacing some 48,000 people. Some of these are also now joining the refugee influx to Thailand although the report put the number so far at only around 4,000.
- 3) The Shan refugees in the headlines during this period were those fleeing the fighting reported above. Since 2000, there have in fact been several unofficial refugee camps right on the border housing people in the immediate areas of conflict between the SSA and SPDC/UWSP totalling two or three thousand refugees, and the population of these camps has grown during this year's fighting. Another group of over 600 refugees arrived in Wiang Heng district of Chiang Mai Province after the fighting on May 20<sup>th</sup>. BBC was officially asked to provide assistance and continues to supply food items although the population has dropped to under 400. The decrease is probably because the Thai authorities announced, but then postponed, a decision to repatriate these people back to Burma. Many Thai villagers also fled the fighting but the Thai authorities mostly took care of these.

This border remains extremely tense. The SPDC has declared its intention to destroy the SSA and moved many troops into the area. The potential remains for further fighting/flare-ups at any time.

#### **e) Mon Resettlement Sites**

The situation in the Mon resettlement sites across the border remains unstable following the resumption of fighting by the breakaway Hongsawatoi Restoration Party (HRP) with SPDC last year. Clashes between the HRP and both SPDC and the New Mon State Party (NMSP) has twice resulted in refugees trying to flee Halochanee and enter Thailand during this six-month period. In each case the refugees were held at the border and sent back as soon as the fighting subdued. Many of the Karen IDPs who formerly lived at Htee Wah Doh near Halochanee have moved out to other hiding sites and some Mon have left Halochanee either as supporters of the HRP or in search of somewhere safer to live.

In 1999 BBC began reducing the amount of assistance given to the resettlement sites following the NMSP ceasefire in 1995 and, as the former refugees have become increasingly self-sufficient, this year gave only four months supply of rice. Unfortunately this will now have to be reconsidered because the deteriorating security situation makes it dangerous for residents to leave the resettlements sites to farm or forage, a new risk being that of land mines now used by all parties to the conflict. There are signs of malnutrition as the population can no longer adequately supplement BBC's minimal rations.

This situation is particularly dangerous for Karen IDPs living in this area. The Karen have no cease-fire deal with SPDC and yet they are still not allowed into Thailand even when there is fighting. The fate of the 63 deported Karen refugees last November is not known. It is thought that they have tried to return to the home areas they fled because there are no safe options for them at the border.

#### **f) Maneeloy Burmese Student Centre**

Our last report detailed the closure of the Maneeloy Burmese Student Centre in December and the transfer of around 400 residents to the new Zone 4 in Tham Hin camp. This caseload included some that were virtually guaranteed resettlement to third countries and others that were not, but believed they should be.

This has been a difficult period of readjustment for these people. The majority of those entitled to resettlement have now gone and the caseload has reduced to fewer than 300 of whom at least 250 have little prospect of resettlement. These people have suffered a dramatic decline in living standards and freedom since moving to Tham Hin and feel abandoned. Their housing situation is not good and it is not easy for these mainly urban people to survive on the same rations as the predominantly Karen Tham Hin population

#### **g) Camp Relocations**

There were no camp relocations during the first half of 2002 but, rather unexpectedly, in July the Thai authorities announced their decision to relocate Karenni Camp 3 to Karenni Camp 2, closer to the border. The reasons cited included a long list of alleged problems between the camp population and the residents of the nearby Thai village of Nai Soi. NGOs and UNHCR asked for the move to be delayed until after the rains but it is currently planned to complete the move by the end of September.

No other camp moves appear to be under consideration at the moment.

#### **h) Ler Ber Her**

The last six-month report described the latest attack on Ler Ber Her, a small camp on the Burma side of the Moei river north of Mae La camp, which was yet again evacuated into Thailand. On January 4<sup>th</sup> a group of around 200 returned once again to the Burma side of the river, to a new location just a little north of the previous site. Since then the population has grown again to around 600 presumably because others who went missing at the time of the attack have returned, but probably also because of the Thai policy not to accept new refugee arrivals. This camp has been attacked four times and it would be optimistic to assume that will not happen again.

#### **i) Illegal Workers**

For the last decade the Thai Government has annually tried to deal with the ever-growing problem of Burmese migrant workers by various types of registration schemes. Whilst acknowledging that there are at least a million illegal Burmese in the country there has been no real attempt to formulate an ongoing strategy other than to say that all those not registered must be deported. The result has been very temporary legal status for a minority of Burmese workers and the exploitation and harassment for the vulnerable majority. There have been ongoing deportations, large-scale at times, but mostly resulting in the workers simply returning again to Thailand. Unfortunately many of these migrant workers are actually refugees who do not have the option of returning home.

Last year the Royal Thai Government decided to allow all illegal workers in Thailand to register and stay in Thailand. Some 568,249 workers registered, of whom 451,335 were Burmese. Although the registration process was considered a success, many workers were deterred from registering by the relatively high fee required and because of doubts about their security. The registration figure also did not include the families of workers who must number at least 200,000. All registered workers were required to get health check-ups and register again after six months and the total number reregistering dropped to 448,480.

The registration period will expire in October and although the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) has been working with the Ministry for Labour and Social Welfare in an attempt to promote a comprehensive long-term strategy, it seems that only those already registered will be allowed to register again. This is likely to result in a further drop in registered caseload and increasing numbers of illegal workers subject to deportation.

Meanwhile in bilateral negotiations with Thailand, SPDC has set up a reception centre in Myawaddy opposite Mae Sot for migrants deported by Thailand, the first of several proposed centres. The plan is that SPDC will be given details of returnees for verification as Burmese citizens and, if accepted, the migrants will stay at the centre prior to being sent back to their homes. Reports suggest that around 3,000 migrants were deported through this centre up to July. There was concern at reports that the returnees were being screened for HIV/AIDS and, if positive, separated from the others before being referred to a hospital in Rangoon

The scale of deportation is currently small, making negligible impact on the total 'illegal' caseload in Thailand. Given SPDC's human rights record and the reasons most Burmese come to Thailand though, this process remains a major protection threat for unregistered refugees. It is hoped that in the longer run a more comprehensive policy can be developed which both affords more protection for all migrant workers and can be more consistently policed.

#### **j) Internally Displaced**

For the last six years the Burmese Army has been destroying or forcibly relocating hundreds, maybe thousands of villages throughout the border areas as it attempts to control the former territory of the ethnic armies. Most of the new refugees arriving in Thailand have been living for some time as Internally Displaced People (IDPs), either in relocation sites under the control of SPDC or in hiding or on the run from the Burmese army. This year has been the worst since 1997 in terms of Burmese army abuses against IDPs.

It is hoped to be able to collate an up-to-date estimate of the scale of displacement in the border areas over the next few months. Work so far indicates that at least 2,500 villages in the Thai/Burmese border states and divisions have been destroyed, abandoned or relocated since 1996 and that the total number of IDPs currently living in relocation sites or in hiding is well over 600,000.

All of these IDPs are potential refugees.

There remains little that can seemingly be done to resolve the IDP problem. The SPDC denies that it exists and there is virtually no access to the affected areas from inside the country. The only assistance being provided is whatever the ethnic groups themselves are able to deliver. This amounts to very little compared with overall needs. Only a change in SPDC tactics or external intervention could solve this problem and neither looks likely at this stage.

## **IDPs**

### 3. BBC PROGRAMME DURING THE FIRST HALF OF 2002

Background information on BBC, including the organisational structure, is given in Appendix A. The relief programme is described in Appendix C.


#### a) Staffing

A record seven new staff positions were approved in the first half of 2002. This was in response to growing administrative tasks in all offices and increasing demands for monitoring information. Each field office will now have a basic team of five persons; a Field Coordinator with overall programme responsibility; two Field Assistants (one new) whose tasks will include collecting the new monitoring statistics; a new Field Administrator who will take over much of the monthly accounting and paperwork with suppliers (previously done by the Field Coordinators); and an Office Secretary. The Field Administrator and Office Secretary jobs in Kanchanaburi will be combined for the time being. A Receptionist has also been recruited for the Bangkok Office. Recruitment for all these positions should be complete by August/September.

This will bring the total BBC staff complement to 25 (15 female/10 male: 8 expatriate/17 Thai). In addition to this, BBC has employed two full-time consultants during this period, one to help prepare a gender policy, the other to review/develop the emergency rice assistance programme, effectively bringing the total staff complement to 27. Figure 3.1 shows the number of BBC staff in relation to the number of camps and number of refugees since 1984. For the first 11 years staffing levels were more or less constant at around one person per 16,000 refugees but that ratio has now trebled to about 3.1 staff per 16,000 in 2002. This was initially because of the increase in BBC's workload after the camps were consolidated in 1995 and the refugees became much more aid-dependent, but since then the rise has been due mainly to the increasingly technical nature of the programme and donor requirements for more reporting and analysis.

Unfortunately, as the programme becomes more sophisticated, yet more staff are likely to be needed. Current pressures include, for example, a response to the nutrition study results, including food security initiatives, technical supervision of quality control, monitoring and evaluations, and implementation of the BBC gender policy. And as BBC expands, its small administrative capacity is strained, human resource support being just one example. This was discussed with the BBC Advisory Committee in June and one of their recommendations is that an evaluation be carried out of BBC's Structure and Management. During any recruitment process an attempt will be made to recruit more women into field staff positions where there is still a large gender imbalance.

**Figure 3.1: BBC Staff Numbers, Refugee Caseload, and Number of Camps 1984-2002**



## **Staff in the Field**

## **b) Rations/Nutrition**

BBC carried out a food consumption/nutrition status survey in Mae La camp in February 2001 and the results were presented in the last six-month Report. Results from a similar survey in Karenni Camp 2 in November 2002 are also now available. These two surveys were very detailed, time-consuming, area-specific surveys and in order to check how representative they were of the border as a whole, a rapid nutrition survey was also carried out in three other camps during May 2002. Comprehensive reports on these surveys are available from BBC and some of the main results are set out on page 11. The general results showed that the refugees are more aid-dependent than previously thought and can be summarised as follows.

- **BBC provides an adequate amount of ration foods to the refugees**

The BBC ration slightly exceeds the minimum kcal per person per day for normal developing country populations (WHO Guidelines). The refugees are eating an adequate amount of food, indicated by survey results that showed that average household intake of kcals in Mae La and Karenni Camp 2 was 97% and 104.5% respectively of the Recommended Daily Allowances for healthy Thais. Acute malnutrition rates for children under five in camps surveyed\* averaged 4.9%. Less than 5% is considered acceptable by WHO criteria.

\*Mae La, Karenni Camp 2, Don Yang, Tham Hin, and Umpiem Mai (WHO/NCHS <-2SD mean w/h).

- **Families use BBC ration foods almost exclusively for consumption within the households**

Although there are limited amounts sold, exchanged, or converted to other types of foods, BBC ration foods are consumed primarily within households, eaten within the camp confines and within the distribution period.

- **The BBC ration supplies nearly all of the nutrients in the diet**

Although families in both Karenni Camp 2 and Mae La are able to grow some vegetables, raise a few animals, forage for foods in the jungle, and exchange or sell foods, most of their intake (89-99% of carbohydrate, protein and fat) comes from ration foods. With the exception of vitamins A and C, which are nearly non-existent in the ration foods, most vitamins and minerals are supplied by ration foods, although in inadequate proportions.

- **The majority of households have very low income and purchasing power**

Although the Mae La and Karenni Camp 2 residents had lived in camp and in Thailand for long enough to develop coping mechanisms, the majority of families are very poor and total monthly food expenditures were reported as only 55 and 70 baht (median) respectively.

- **Chronic malnutrition is prevalent**

This type of malnutrition may be due to overall poor economic conditions, frequent infection, poor maternal nutrition, and a diet lacking in complementary or animal protein and low in micronutrients. Children suffering from chronic malnutrition will display stunted physical and possibly mental development (e.g. they will not grow as tall as they should and may have decreased learning capacity). The BBC ration is heavy on carbohydrates, mainly from rice, which is requested and normally eaten in large amounts. But, a high intake of rice leaves less room for other foods that contain protein, fat, and vitamins and minerals.

## **BBC Response**

The rationale used for planning food aid is constantly evolving. It was previously thought that if enough kilocalories were provided, micronutrients would follow in adequate proportions and clearly the BBC food basket meets the recommended energy level targets. However more recent research has led the food aid and nutrition community to become more concerned about ensuring adequate micronutrients in the ration, particularly for those populations totally dependent on food aid. Without the benefit of other sources of foods, populations dependent on rations that are lacking in essential micronutrients are at risk of nutrient deficiencies. Deficiencies, even when mild, can affect all body systems, with results such as weakened immune function, and poor growth and lower learning capacity.

The results of the nutrition surveys show consistently that there are significant micronutrient deficiencies in the refugee diet as well as an imbalance in the proportion of carbohydrate/protein/fat. It is also clear that whilst more can be done to encourage vegetable growing in the camps (see food security below), the scope for this is limited and the refugees themselves will not be able to adequately supplement the BBC ration themselves. Responding to the dietary deficiencies will require a number of different approaches and the cooperation of the refugee communities, other NGOs, the Thai authorities and the donors.

## **Malnutrition: Causes and Outcomes**

Whilst refugees can and will be encouraged to grow more food in the camps and, in the longer term, nutritional education can address cultural eating habits, the immediate need is to provide better quality protein and ensure provision of micronutrients in the food basket. Provision of fresh foods, such as vegetables and fish would be ideal to satisfy these requirements, but are very expensive and logistically very difficult. In addition, balancing the food basket whilst considering the refugees' preference for eating large quantities of rice remains a challenge.

To identify other options, BBC staff recently visited the World Food Programme in Bangladesh and concluded that providing 'blended foods' similar to what WFP is giving the Rohingya refugees would be an ideal solution. 'Blended food' is a term used to describe a mix of flours fortified with extra vitamins and minerals. The combination of flours from cereals and legumes provides a good quality protein, and the blend meets nearly all the minimum requirements for micronutrients. Blended foods also make a perfect complementary and weaning food for younger children. WFP uses blended foods globally and distributes it in the general ration to populations that are totally reliant on aid. In Bangladesh WFP mixes its own blends.

BBC therefore proposes the following immediate responses to the nutrition survey results:

- Provide a blended food in the ration: BBC has already contacted potential suppliers of blended food in Bangkok and has concluded that the necessary ingredients and expertise are available to set up a production unit with the capacity of supplying a ration of up to 1.5 kgs of blended food per person each month. Developing and introducing blended food will require further research, including devising an appropriate recipe, negotiating the cost, developing a strategy to introduce the food to the refugees, and monitoring use and intake. The current concept is to develop a recipe to meet specific requirements for protein and fat, which will likely include rice and mung bean flours, gluten, and oil. This recipe will need to be field-tested before border-wide implementation. Whilst more detailed specifications and costings are being worked out, the budget presented in Section 6 includes blended food at baht 45/kg.
- Reduce some other Food Basket Items: The provision of blended food should enable some reduction in other food basket items, probably rice and cooking oil, and the budget assumes that the basic rice ration can be reduced from 16 to 15 kgs and oil from one litre to 70 mls. Any reduction in the rice ration will have to be introduced very carefully. The refugees have grown up using standard measuring tins both at the distribution point and in the households. Less than full measures would be considered inadequate. A key to this will probably be the purchase or manufacture of measuring tins and cups appropriate to the new ration rates. A reduction will have little or no effect on the proportion of carbohydrate/protein/fat in the ration, but the addition of blended foods will increase the amount of quality protein in the diet.
- Continue to encourage provision of adequate and appropriate supplementary feeding foods in all camps and provide nutrition education: The types and amounts of foods provided by the Health Agencies in their supplementary feeding programmes still vary in some camps. Appropriate foods should be provided in adequate quantities targeting pregnant women to ensure optimal nutrition and weight gain and prevent stunting *in utero*. Adherence to UNHCR/WFP Guidelines for Supplementary Feeding will be encouraged. BBC staff will support nutrition education efforts in the camps providing any technical assistance requested by the medical agencies and introducing blended foods for use in weaning and other projects as deemed appropriate.
- Continue identifying and supporting food security and gardening projects: Projects such as the Community Agriculture and Nutrition Worker's (CAN) project provide households with alternate sources of fresh foods (see Food Security below).

BBC will seek MOI approval when the recommended detailed food basket adjustment has been finalised. It is hoped to introduce the blended food on a trial basis from February 2003 and border-wide from April. But since this is an expensive item for which Donor funding will first have to be secured.

### **c) Food Security**

At the beginning of 2000, MOI introduced a new policy to encourage NGOs to support projects enabling refugees to grow vegetables and livestock for their own consumption. Prior to this, seeds had been distributed as requested and some small agricultural initiatives had been undertaken in some camps, but this new policy enables a more comprehensive approach. In response, a number of NGOs have set up training courses and small agriculture support projects in some of the camps.

With increased focus on the nutritional status of the refugees and results from the food consumption/nutrition surveys in hand, BBC has actively supported food security projects as a way of supplementing BBC rations and targeting micronutrient deficiencies. In particular, BBC has provided start-up materials, such as seeds and tools, and nutrition training to the Community Agriculture and Nutrition Worker's (CAN) project.

This innovative project, initiated by a refugee in Karenni Camp 3, trains camp residents in organic gardening techniques using limited space and focuses on growing food that target specific nutrient deficiencies, particularly vitamin A and C and iron. The project has been successfully implemented in Karenni Camp 2 via a 'demonstration' site and short, 5-day trainings for camp residents. Already small household projects using the CAN technology are springing up. BBC, in collaboration with Consortium Thailand and the Karen Refugee Committee, will encourage transfer of this technology to other camps on the border. BBC will also continue to support other requests for seeds and saplings, and will continue to analyse this situation to provide support/coordination where appropriate.

#### **d) Monitoring/Performance Indicators**

BBC has been developing Performance Indicators to measure the achievement of BBC's objectives since late 2000. This has involved the drawing up of a logical framework, identifying priority indicators and establishing the necessary data collection procedures. Data is now available to calculate almost all of the priority indicators and these will be complete by the end of the year.

The main activities during the first half of 2002 were establishing systematic distribution, ration book and household control checks, and introducing standardised stock and distribution records. Although BBC has always carried out random checks of the distributions, the introduction of formal control checks after 18 years was a sensitive issue requiring the full understanding and support of the refugee committees. The forms and procedures were designed with their full participation and tested during 2001. During this year the checks were introduced and established in each area, starting with small sample rates to familiarise everyone involved with the new process. Additional field staff are now being recruited to handle the increased work-load and during the next the six-month period they will be trained in the new procedures. Once staff are familiar with the system, sample rates will be increased to more optimum levels in 2003.

The priority Performance Indicators are set out in Section 4. These relate only to food distribution and during this next six months similar indicators will be agreed for shelter and other relief items. The Logframe is now also to be extended to include gender and refugee participation goals, which will also require their own indicators. Progress on this will be reported at the BBC Donors Meeting in October.

#### **e) Gender**

BBC first committed itself to consider gender-related issues of its organisation and work at the Donors Meeting held in Stockholm in 1997 and established a policy to encourage equal participation of men and women in the planning and delivery of the programme. A workshop was held in 2000 to raise staff awareness of gender issues, but until this year other priorities have meant there has been little progress towards establishing a gender policy with a comprehensive action plan to achieve its goals. To address this and give gender a higher priority, a consultant was recruited for 6 months from February 2002 to assist in developing a BBC gender policy. During the period, observation and analysis of gender awareness and responsiveness in both BBC's organisation and field programme provided plenty of material for discussions. Levels of understanding amongst BBC staff are varied and during the workshops many challenges were highlighted for BBC to address in its future plans. It became clear that the provision of equal opportunity does not necessarily lead to equal participation, without pro-active work to achieve positive change. Staff realise that the process of transformation is inevitably slow, and will require long term commitment and enthusiasm on the part of many rather than just a few individuals, especially in a culturally diverse population.

As a well-respected, border-wide organisation, BBC is in an excellent position to support refugee women's greater participation in decision making processes, and encourage men to recognise women's human rights as equal to their own. In the camp communities, women's organisations have reacted favourably to the idea that BBC will support their own attempts towards empowerment.

Draft Gender policy guidelines will be presented at the Donors Meeting in Ottawa, which will highlight BBC's commitment and provide a framework for practical steps to be taken to implement this in the field programme and within the organisation. A realistic plan of action will shape BBC's work in the forthcoming months, to ensure that greater gender awareness remains clearly in focus.

## **f) Protection**

BBC has participated fully in the CCSDPT/UNHCR protection working group set up following the workshop "Protection is a shared responsibility" jointly organised by CCSDPT and UNHCR in August 2000. During 2001/2 this working group organised five specific protection workshops on 'Education', 'Food, Shelter, Water and Sanitation', 'Health', 'Sexual and Gender Based Violence' (SGBV) and 'Refugees outside Camps'.

In response to the workshops BBC is committed to reducing the need for refugees to leave camps where they are subject to arrest and other physical abuse by Thai authorities and local communities. BBC will try to provide sufficient building materials and greater support for initiatives to improve agriculture and vegetable gardens in the camps to supplement the basic food basket.

Increased representation of the camp population on camp committees is currently being explored through the ongoing work on gender.

A great deal has been achieved during these two years to improve NGO awareness of and participation in protection issues and a second Director-level UNHCR/NGO protection workshop will be held in September to review progress and make ongoing plans.

## **g) Environment**

As described in f) and h) Appendix C, BBC has been supplying cooking fuel and building materials since 1995 when the first large camp was established at Mae La. These supplies were introduced incrementally but now all camps are receiving cooking fuel and building supplies for annual repairs to all camp buildings as well as shelters for new arrivals. These items will represent about 20% of total BBC expenditures in 2002.

### **Cooking Fuel**

BBC has now implemented most of the recommendations from the UNHCR consultant's review of BBC's cooking fuel supplies undertaken in May 2000. Outstanding projects are the extension of improved cooking stoves to Tak, Kanchanaburi and Ratchaburi provinces and teaching improving cooking methods. BBC does not have the staff resources for intense camp-based activities such as these and these tasks will be taken up in coordination with another NGO.

Previous reports have detailed the success of an experiment introducing firewood to cover part of the cooking fuel needs of Tham Hin camp. 50% of the camp cooking fuel energy needs were supplied as firewood, which proved acceptable to the local Thai authorities, the refugee committees and the camp population and saved BBC 34% on costs as compared with supplying 100% charcoal. Last year MOI approved an extension of the experiment to Karenni Camp 3 and Umpiem Mai at the same proportion and asked that the proportion of firewood in Tham Hin be increased to 70%.

Unfortunately this second phase of the experiment has been less successful. So far it has been difficult to find economic sources of firewood for these more remote camps and the supply is limited. The residents of Umpiem Mai are concerned about fire risk due to high winds in the camp, but the trial will be extended until the end of the year by supplying windbreakers. The residents of Karenni Camp 3 responded favourably to the inclusion of firewood, but now that Camp 3 will be moved to Camp 2, firewood supply will be impractical. This is because firewood is far too bulky for the 4W drive pick-up trucks which have to be used for delivery to that area. Furthermore, the Tham Hin residents are not happy with the new balance of charcoal and firewood although they persevere.

This means that the scope and benefits of introducing firewood are likely to be much less than had originally been anticipated, and possibly practical in only two or three camps. However the experiments will continue. BBC will try to source cheaper supplies and will look at the potential for firewood use in the largest camp at Mae La.

New charcoal products continue to be introduced to the market all the time and BBC is considering whether to engage a consultant to review the overall situation again now that most of the earlier recommendations have been implemented and a new base-line established.

## **Programme Supplies**

## **Building Materials**

BBC supplied building materials for house repairs to all camps for the first time in 2000 but different standards were used in different camps depending on the availability of local supplies. It proved difficult to procure adequate and consistently good quality supplies due largely to many restrictions on cutting and transporting bamboo in Thailand. Some improvements were achieved in 2002 but there were still significant differences in supplies given to different camps.

Refugees going out of the camps to cut materials is now considered a serious protection issue, aggravating relationships with the Thai authorities and exposing the refugees to arrest and, sometimes, physical abuse. BBC has established standards to ensure that refugees will receive sufficient materials for building and repairs, which it hopes can be applied to all camps for 2003 as set out in Appendix C.

This attention to environmental needs will increase the cost of these two items from baht 112 million in 2002 to baht 144 million in 2003.

### **h) Supply Purchasing/Tendering**

BBC now carries out competitive tendering border-wide for rice, mung beans, cooking oil, cooking fuel, bednets, blankets and sleeping mats, representing about 85% of all BBC commodity purchases. The whole procurement process, including the advertising of tenders, bidding process, opening of bids, awarding of contracts and invoice/payment procedures, has been upgraded and standardised to meet major donor requirements. BBC had hoped that ECHO would evaluate these procedures early in 2002 but this did not happen. It is now anticipated that these will be reviewed later this year as part of the BBC contract for US government funding.

The introduction of competitive tendering has undoubtedly been successful in ensuring that the suppliers offer the best possible prices, but it has also created problems. The basic problem is the difficulty of balancing prices paid with the quality of service provided. BBC relies heavily on its suppliers to solve frequent delivery problems due to adverse security situations, weather, road conditions or difficulties with the local authorities. Suppliers offering the lowest prices are often not able to guarantee the same levels of reliability as established suppliers, especially if they are based far from the border. To deal with this, BBC has developed selection criteria, which take into account suppliers' past performance and familiarity with the delivery conditions, as well as their experience as commodity suppliers. These factors will often out-weigh small cost differences. As a result, most contracts have in fact continued to be awarded to local suppliers who have years of experience and greatest familiarity with the delivery conditions. But some new suppliers have been, and are still being, introduced.

This problem becomes critical when newcomers make very low speculative bids, which cannot be ignored. Provided their basic credentials look satisfactory, the only way to check them has been to award them a contract, but this has proven problematic in many cases with failure to meet quality and/ or delivery standards. BBC minimises this risk by only giving smaller contracts to new companies and limits the number of new suppliers under trial at any one time. If major problems arise the companies are not considered again.

Unfortunately the trial of low-cost newcomers has forced the experienced suppliers to cut their margins to the limit where they can ill-afford any unforeseen market fluctuations. Rice prices have recently started to rise sharply again and this has undermined some contracts. Suppliers have been cheated by rice mills who are not prepared to honour commitments made at the bidding stage. This has resulted in sub-standard deliveries and losses to the suppliers who have been obliged to replace them. It would be unfortunate indeed if the tendering process resulted in the collapse of long established local businesses.

Another negative result of cut-throat competitiveness has been the exploitation of vagaries in the Thai rice grading system. There are many grades of Thai rice and BBC purchases what are essentially mixtures of broken rice, by-products of the milling process. The broken rice grades embrace a wide-range of tolerance with BBC's preferred A1 Super Broken Rice, for example, being acceptable to the refugees at the high end, but unacceptable at the low end. Before the introduction of competitive tendering and independent quality control, the local suppliers knew and delivered what was acceptable to the refugees, and willingly changed any that the refugees rejected. This was calculated in their prices. However, now that profit margins are squeezed to the limit there is a temptation to supply the minimum specification according to the contract, again resulting in complaints from the refugees that the quality is not good enough.

These can all be considered 'teething problems' following the introduction of competitive tendering, but are likely to remain ongoing problems in the future. It will always be difficult to balance quality and service with price, and to deal with aggressive businesses in a competitive market place.

## **i) Quality Control**

BBC contracted a professional quality control company for the first time in 2001 and carried out independent quality control inspections of all ECHO contracts. One in ten or 25 of every sack/container was checked of rice, mung beans, cooking oil and cooking fuel delivered to Umpiem Mai and Mae La camps. Checks were made on weight, packaging and quality, as per contract.

The refugee committees continued to carry out a second check at the time of delivery/distribution. These visual checks are in some ways more comprehensive than the independent inspections because the committees check every sack/container rather than a 4 to 10% sample.

All of the supplies passed the checks in 2001 (most, easily), but BBC considered them to be a useful safeguard, particularly when introducing new suppliers and for the stockpile period when the refugee committees only check quality at the time of distribution, well after the date of delivery. It was concluded that the combination of independent inspections at the loading point, refugee committee checks in camp plus BBC staff monitoring, makes for very effective quality control. Given the zero rejection rate however, checking every truck seemed rather excessive and for ECHO contracts in 2002, 50% rather than 100% of deliveries are being checked.

Since the beginning of 2002 BBC has started carrying out sample checks on all contracts for rice, beans, oil and charcoal for all other camps as well. At least one professional inspection is carried out per contract (usually six months) but more frequent checks are requested where problems are reported or new suppliers introduced. A second inspection company is being trialed during this period. The results are set out in Section 4. The checks did uncover some deficient supplies, which were either replaced, or the supplier penalised.

## **j) IDPs**

BBC recruited a temporary Database Coordinator from the Asian Research Centre for Migration, Chulalongkorn University in May 2001, to assist the ethnic groups in setting up a computer databank of IDP information. Data collected over the last two years (and even earlier for some of the groups) is being coded and more extensive and standardised data collection forms aimed at facilitating more detailed and comparative analysis have been introduced. The database coordinator has now finished her contract and the ethnic groups are continuing with this work.

The computer database is taking longer to establish than had been hoped and since the IDP situation has become even more critical, there is an urgent need for updated information. The ethnic groups have therefore also been manually collating all known information on IDP relocation and hiding sites and preparing maps and population estimates. This overview will be available during the second half of 2002.

BBC recruited a consultant to oversee this work for the first half of 2002 and he will now continue through to the end of the year. Another important part of his assignment is to carry out a review of the effectiveness of the emergency rice assistance programme which will be presented at the Donors Meeting.

## **k) Assistance to Thai Villages**

As described in l) Appendix C, the BBC continues to support requests for assistance to Thai communities. Much of the support goes to Thai authority personnel involved in camp security. But BBC also supports emergency and development requests. During this period, BBC support included the provision of thatch for Thai village houses destroyed by storm in the Mae La area and support for some Thai schools.

BBC has been purchasing vegetables for Tham Hin Camp from villages in Suan Phung District since July 2001. The initial target was to buy 1,800 kgs of vegetables per month (1 kg per family), choosing those with a reasonable storage period such as cabbages, eggplant and cauliflower. The quantity was increased to 4,000 kgs per month in March 2002 to enable a more equitable distribution by family size.

Since the supply is procured from local villages, it is not always easy to know in advance which durable vegetables will be available in the quantities required and at a reasonable price. With UNHCR-sponsored vocational training programmes scheduled to begin in Tham Hin later this year, it is hoped that more land will become available for the camp residents to grow more of their own vegetables. It is therefore not envisaged that the vegetable procurement will increase any further, but since this is primarily a public relations exercise, it is unlikely that this project will completely disappear either.

## **l) Safe House**

Patient numbers at the Safe House stayed relatively stable at around 30 during the last six months, not including four children of the patients also staying at the residence. Fully half of the patients are suffering from psychiatric disorders, the remainder from a variety of chronic illnesses including stroke, paralysis and epilepsy. All patients are encouraged to participate in the daily activities of the Safe House where possible and, with the appropriate medication now being prescribed, have become much more active in the vegetable gardening, poultry, fish and pig raising, and sewing/weaving projects. Paw Lulu, the Housemother, had five assistants to oversee the care of the patients. However, in recognition of the extra supervision requirements now needed for these activities (and the need to have another female assistant for the care of the female patients), an additional person was recruited in June who can also teach sewing and weaving.

On advice from the local health authorities that visited the house in March, some additional drainage pits were dug, drainage for existing bathrooms and animal raising areas was improved, and two new bathrooms constructed to improve the overall sanitation of the grounds.

## **m) Visibility**

The Donors Meeting held in Chiang Mai in October 2001 adopted the BBC 'visibility' policy which is set out in z) Appendix C. This is in effect an 'invisibility' policy reaffirming BBC's longstanding policy of maintaining a low key profile on the border.

ECHO however, currently BBC's largest Donor, still legally requires visibility for their input to the programme, but in the spirit of the BBC policy have agreed to specific inputs aimed at benefiting the refugees rather than the printing of logos on sacks and containers required last year. The project will include the installation of health notice boards at each godown, which will include information about ECHO (and other Donors), health and nutrition information and other camp information. Camp committee members and godown workers will receive T-shirts/jackets/baseball caps with ECHO logos for those working in Mae La camp and sports prizes will be given for the sports events in each camp.

## **n) Camp Administration Support**

As described in r) Appendix C, in 2002 BBC has established a standard rate of baht 1.8/refugee/per month for the refugee committees to carry out their administrative duties in the camps, replacing the old system whereby they retained a proportion of proceeds from the sale of rice sacks. This now appears as a budget line item. These funds will be used for many types of expenditure such as the purchase of office supplies, torch batteries for night patrols, funerals, festivals, travel costs, entertaining visitors, social welfare and stipends for volunteers, and the committees will present six-monthly accounts.

## **o) Clothing**

As described in g) Appendix C, BBC has been organising distributions of used clothing from overseas for several years. Delays within the Thai bureaucracy have invariably meant that these supplies have been distributed later than intended, and in 2002 BBC received a late shipment of warm clothing from the Shanti Volunteer Association in January which provided every refugee with a good quality item. 26% of the shipment was also distributed to nearby Thai communities. This shipment was particularly popular because refugees found such treats as designer sunglasses and 1000 yen notes in some of the pockets!

New shipments from the Shanti Volunteer Association and Lutheran World Relief have been ordered for the 2002/3 cool season, with the intention of providing every refugee with two items of clothing. But in spite of everyone's best efforts it looks as though it will not be possible to get the SVA shipment through the bureaucracy in time. If so, BBC has budgeted to buy one item of clothing per refugee from the Thai market.

In 2002 BBC has also supported a longyi-weaving project organised by the Karen and Karenni women's organisations. A longyi is a Burmese style wrap-around 'skirt' worn by both men and women. The aim is for all the camps to produce one longyi for men and women in alternate years. So far longyis have been provided for all women in Mae La and Umpiem Mai camps and the camps in Tak province will continue to provide for all the Karen camps this year. The Karen women's organisations hope to have installed sufficient looms and provided training to all camps by the end of 2002 so that they can produce their own longyis in 2003. The Karenni women's organisations will have produced sufficient longyis for the Karenni women by the end of 2002. BBC supplied thread and additional looms providing an occupation for a large number of camp residents. Next year the project will make one longyi for each male in the camps.

## Camp Life

#### 4. BBC PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

At the end of 2000, BBC began to develop Performance Indicators to assess the achievement of its programme objectives. It was decided that the initial priority would be to produce indicators to measure the achievement of BBC's main objective, which is:

- To ensure that displaced persons from Burma receive adequate availability and access to food to sustain life.

Figure 4.1 sets out BBC's Logframe showing the priority Performance Indicators adopted and the proposed Means of Verification. These primarily comprise health/nutrition indicators and indicators measuring the effectiveness of the delivery and distribution of supplies. It was planned to have all these indicators available during 2002 and work is on target. Progress is as follows:

##### **Indicator 1: Percentage of children <5 with wasting malnutrition:**

###### *Means of Verification*

- BBC Supplementary Feeding Statistics: children <5 enrolled in supplementary feeding programmes.
- Nutrition Survey: children <5 weight/height measurements (WHO/NCHS%median).
- Common Data Collection: children identified as malnourished (will be implemented in 2003).

BBC has, since mid-1999, presented statistics on the number of malnourished children receiving supplementary feeding from the medical NGOs at their clinics. Statistics for the second half of 2002 are as follows:

**Figure 4.2: Number of Children < 5 Enrolled in Supplementary Feeding Programmes: Jan – Jun 2002**

Camp(s)	NGO	Jan-02		Feb-02		Mar-02		Apr-02		May-02		Jun-02		6 Month Average		% of Pop. <sup>3</sup> < 5 years	
		Mod <sup>1</sup>	Sev	Mod	Sev	Mod	Sev	Mod	Sev	Mod	Sev	Mod	Sev	Mod	Sev	Mod	Sev
Camps 2, 3 & 5	IRC	24	0	18	0	11	0	10	0	13	0	16	0	15	0	0.57%	0.00%
Mae Kong Kha	MHD	3	0	n/a	n/a	2	0	1	0	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	2	0	0.07%	0.00%
Mae Ra Ma Luang	AMI/MHD	30	0	39	0	52	0	37	0	31	0	28	0	36	0	2.32%	0.00%
Mae La	MSF	42	6	29	7	30	2	21	9	19	4	21	5	27	6	0.46%	0.09%
Umpiem Mai	ARC	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	2	0	n/a	n/a	2	0	0.11%	0.00%
Nu Po	ARC	16	0	16	0	16	0	15	0	17	0	n/a	n/a	16	0	1.24%	0.00%
Ban Don Yang	ARC	22	0	10	0	9	0	5	0	7	0	n/a	n/a	11	0	1.71%	0.00%
Halocheanee/JDC	MSF	54	0	9	0	28	0	25	0	19	0	14	0	25	0	4.32%	0.00%
Tham Hin	MSF	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
<b>Total</b>		<b>191</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>148</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>108</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>0.80%</b>	<b>0.03%</b>
<b>Total Global Malnutrition<sup>2</sup></b>		<b>197</b>		<b>128</b>		<b>150</b>		<b>123</b>		<b>112</b>		<b>84</b>		<b>140</b>		<b>0.83%<sup>4</sup></b>	

1. Mod = moderate malnutrition (<80% median W/H); Sev = severe malnutrition (<70% median W/H, WHO/NCHS Reference Standards) Figures based on average monthly caseload reported by NGOs on statistics reports to BBC.
2. Total Global Malnutrition prevalence = severe + moderate.
3. Population figures from medical agencies via CCSDPT Common Data form.
4. WHO states that malnutrition <5% is 'acceptable,' 5-9% poor, etc. Thailand's malnutrition rate in 1993 = 5.9%.

The number of malnourished patients enrolled in the supplementary feeding programmes remains very small, representing only 0.83% of the under-5 population in the camps. This compares with average global malnutrition rates of 1.24%, 0.57%, 0.75%, and 1.2% in the previous four six-month periods respectively.

These numbers should accurately represent the prevalence of malnutrition in children in the majority of camps, assuming that children are identified and treated. However, the recent nutrition surveys indicate that the actual rate may be either slightly higher or lower than supplementary feeding figures. For example, *using the same criteria as is used in the camps (%median wt/ht)*, the surveys showed the following rates: Karenni Camp 2: 0.7%; Don Yang: 1.3% Umpiem Mai: 2.6%; Tham Hin: 1.5%. The differences may be due to slight variations in age of children who are enrolled (e.g. different age recording systems can mean <5 is 4.9 to 5.9 years), in entrance weight and height criteria, or in program coverage. Camps that have higher rates of malnutrition may have more illness, poorer feeding practices of small children, or a more transient population that needs to share ration food more often.

BBC will continue to encourage nutrition surveillance and monitoring among the medical agencies, and the new common data system will help to ensure standardised monitoring.





Figure 4.1. Logical Framework of BBC Programme

<b>GOAL: To alleviate malnutrition and food insecurity</b>			
<b>Objectives</b>	<b>Performance Indicators</b>	<b>Means of Verification for Monitoring and Coordination</b>	<b>Assumptions and Risks</b>
<p><b>Objective:</b></p> <p>To ensure that the displaced persons receive adequate availability and access to food to sustain life</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>% children &lt; 5 with wasting malnutrition</li> <li>% children &lt; 5 with signs of xerophthalmia (vitamin A deficiency)</li> <li>% population diagnosed with clinically apparent thiamine deficiency (vitamin B1 deficiency)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Common data collection</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. children &lt; 5 enrolled in supplementary and therapeutic feeding programmes (excluding new arrivals)</li> <li>ii. clinical incidence of thiamine deficiency</li> </ul> </li> <li>• <b>Nutrition survey</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. children &lt; 5 weight/height measurements</li> <li>ii. clinical examinations for vitamin A deficiency</li> <li>iii. actual nutrient intake</li> </ul> </li> <li>• <b>Medical agency data</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. screening and clinical incidence of vitamin A deficiency</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- RTG policy allows appropriate level of services</li> <li>- No sudden massive influx of new arrivals</li> <li>- Cooperation from medical agencies</li> <li>- Presence of epidemics</li> <li>- No camp attacks</li> <li>- People able to plant/forage/earn income</li> <li>- Access denied due to weather/RTG policy</li> </ul>
<p><b>Output:</b></p> <p>All the displaced persons in camps will receive basic food basket and adequate cooking fuel</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ration provides av. 2,100 kcals/person</li> <li>% of commodities meeting the quality specifications agreed upon by BBC and the suppliers</li> <li>% distribution points that are readily accessible to all recognised population recorded by camp committee and at convenient times</li> <li>% recognised camp population receive the rations planned</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Nutritional analysis of ration</li> <li>• Quality – SGS reports</li> <li>• Acceptance by camp committee</li> <li>• Go-down locations monitored: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. No of refugees per distribution point</li> <li>ii. Furthest walking distance from distribution point</li> <li>iii. Camp distribution schedules</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Up-to-date population figures - registered &amp; new arrivals</li> <li>• Stock and Distribution records</li> <li>• Ration books.</li> <li>• Ration received after distribution <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. At distribution point</li> <li>ii. Household</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- No sudden massive influx of new arrivals</li> <li>- No camp attacks</li> <li>- Access denied due to weather/RTG policy</li> </ul>
<p><b>Activities:</b></p> <p>a) Procurement and delivery of supplies</p> <p>b) Distribution and monitoring of supplies</p>	<p><b>Inputs:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• tendering, payment, logistics, human resources</li> <li>• Distribution of goods by camp committees</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Funding receipts/expectations.</li> <li>• Tendering <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. % of purchases tendered</li> <li>ii. Average no of bids</li> <li>iii. Delivery slips/Purchase orders</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Camp visits <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. Monthly monitoring checklist</li> <li>ii. Camp records</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Donor commitment to funding</li> <li>- Sufficient commodities available in marketplace</li> <li>- No camp attacks</li> <li>- Access denied due to weather/RTG policy</li> <li>- Adequate staff</li> </ul>

## **Indicator 2: Percentage of children <5 with signs of xerophthalmia (Vitamin A deficiency)**

### *Means of Verification*

- Nutrition Survey: clinical examinations for vitamin A deficiency.
- Medical Agency Data: screening and clinical incidence of vitamin A deficiency.

No children under five (0%) were found with signs of vitamin A deficiency from the nutrition surveys in Karenni Camp 2, Tham Hin, Don Yang and Umpiem Mai. However, the nutrition survey results showed that vitamin A consumed in households in both Mae La and Camp 2 is well below recommendations. The medical agencies routinely provide Vitamin A supplements to children <5 because they are most at risk for deficiency (which can cause permanent blindness and death). BBC will assume responsibility for coordinating vitamin A procurement (via donation from UNICEF), distribution to medical agencies, and monitoring during 2003.

## **Indicator 3: Percentage of population diagnosed with clinically apparent thiamine (vitamin B<sub>1</sub>) deficiency**

### *Means of Verification*

- Common Data Collection: clinical incidence of thiamine deficiency.

Data collected from all camps for January through June 2002 show the following rates of vitamin B<sub>1</sub> deficiency:

**Figure 4.3: Vitamin B1 Deficiency, January to June 2002**

Age Group	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun
< 5 Years	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.1	1.0	N/A
> 5 Years	5.8	5.7	5.2	4.8	4.5	N/A
All Ages	5.8	5.7	5.2	4.8	4.5	N/A
All Ages Jul-Dec 01	7.0	7.0	6.5	9.0	5.7	5.7

Rate = Cases/1000 persons.

Data from CCSDPT Common Data for 2002.

According to the Sphere Project, the nutritional needs of the population are met when 'there are no cases of...beri beri' (vitamin B<sub>1</sub> deficiency). The CCSDPT has revised the guidelines for diagnosing vitamin B<sub>1</sub> deficiency to reflect the true incidence more accurately, and thus rates are lower than the last six-month period for most camps. Because of the diet based on polished rice and other factors that inhibit vitamin B<sub>1</sub>, some cases of deficiency will be expected. 'Acceptable rates' will be determined following final revision of guidelines and re-training of medics in camps.

## **Indicator 4: Ration provides average 2,100 kcals/person/day**

### *Means of Verification*

- Nutritional analysis of ration.

The nutritional content of BBC's basic food basket standard ration is calculated at approximately 2,230 kcals/person/day border-wide. This meets the WFP/UNHCR recommendation of a minimum of 2,100 kcals/person/day. Calculations are based on data from the Institute of Nutrition at Mahidol University, ASEAN Food Composition Tables (2000). The actual ration may vary slightly between camps, but all variations meet the minimum recommendation.

## **Indicator 5: Percentage of commodities meeting the quality specifications agreed upon by BBC and the suppliers.**

### *Means of Verification*

- Reports of Independent Inspectors.
- Acceptance by camp committee.

For the first half of 2002 independent inspectors carried out inspections of deliveries of rice, beans, cooking oil and charcoal for each purchase-contract border-wide. The results are given in Figure 4.4.

**Figure 4.4: Results of Quality Control Inspections, January to June 2002**

Commodity	Quantity Checked (1,4)	% of all purchases in period (2)	% Checked (3)	Quantity Check		Quality Check	
				Amount verified (4)	% Short	Amount Sub-standard (5)	% Sub-standard
Rice (MT)	4,286	27	10	4,269	0.39	250	5.8
Mung Beans (MT)	222	22	10	222	0.21	0	0
Cooking Oil (ltr)	272,402	30	10	273,397	-0.37	0	0
Charcoal (MT)	1,549	24	4	1,556	-0.44	30	1.9

1. This table summarises the results of checks made by independent inspectors on these shipments during the period.
2. The shipments checked were between 22 and 30% of all purchases of these items during the period. Sample target was 50% of all deliveries to Mae La and once per contract (usually six months) for all other camps.
3. One in 10 (10%) sacks/drums of rice, beans and oil, and one in 25 (4%) sacks of charcoal were tested for each shipment.
4. Quantity Checked is the amount contracted with the supplier or factory. Amount verified is the amount determined by the Inspector.
5. Amount Sub-Standard is amount rejected by Inspector for not meeting quality/packaging contract standard.

The Independent checks confirmed that the suppliers were sending supplies very close in weight/volume to contract, and a minimum of 94% of any commodity met the quality specifications agreed with BBC.

The independent inspectors check a sample of supplies, but the refugees then check every sack/container at the time of receipt/distribution. The failure of some supplies to meet the contract standards during the independent sample checks led to further checks at the camp level and the ultimate rejection of about 800MT of rice during the period or about 5% of all rice deliveries. Suppliers were either penalised, replaced defective items, or sent in additional supplies to make up for losses.

Rice sacks rejected by the committees during distribution are now recorded as part of the regular monitoring reports as shown in s) Appendix C. This system was not fully functional during this period recording only 45 sacks of rice rejected by the committees and replaced by the suppliers. More complete records will be available for the second half of 2002.

**Indicator 6: Percentage of distribution points that are readily accessible to all recognised population recorded by camp committee and at convenient times**

*Means of Verification*

- Go-down locations. Number of refugees per distribution point.
- Go-down locations. Furthest walking distance from distribution point.
- Camp Committee distribution schedules.

The average number of refugees served by each distribution centre is 3,110, with a maximum of 10,337 in Mae La and a minimum of 1,064 in Mae Ra Ma Luang. (Sphere Project minimum standard is 20,000:1).

Following the construction of a new godown in Umpiem Mai camp, all camp distribution points are within one kilometre walking distance of the population. This compares with the UNHCR minimum standard of five kms.

Refugees are informed of distribution times in advance. Distribution is carried out all day by section but supplies may be collected after the allocated distribution time.

**Indicator 7: Percentage of recognised population that received the rations planned**

*Means of Verification*

- Up-to-date population figures, registered and new arrivals.
- Stock and distribution records.
- Ration book control checks.
- Control checks on rations received after distribution.
- Household checks.

The BBC receives **updated population figures** from the camp committees every month including adjustments for new arrivals, births and deaths. These are cross-correlated against UNHCR registration figures and, where available, MOI camp commander statistics. These are considered an accurate record on which to base camp supplies.

**Stock and distribution records** were upgraded and standardised and introduced to all camps during the first half of 2002 and summary statistics confirming the distribution of supplies will be available for the second half of the year. This will compare the amount of stock distributed with the overall calculated need of the population to give the 'distribution accuracy rating'.

The accuracy of **ration books** are being checked as part of the regular staff control checks (see s) Appendix C). Although only a small sample was taken during this period, 52 out of 54 ration books (96%) were found to be accurate. Ration books are currently designed by the individual camp committees and vary in quality. BBC is considering printing standard ration books for all camps.

Random control **checks on the weight** of rice and beans received after the distribution points are now also being regularly carried out (see s) Appendix C). Again the sample taken during this period was small, but the checks showed that for 200 families spread among all the camps, on average they received 100% of their intended ration, with 91.5% receiving within plus or minus the calculated ration. Reasons for variations both above and below ration are being checked and addressed. In most cases the reasons are acceptable.

Control checks on a random **sample of households** each month to confirm that all supplies have been received. 95 household checks were made during this period and 92 (97%) were judged to have received their full ration entitlements.

#### **Inputs 1: tendering, payment, logistics, human resources**

- Funding receipts/expectations.
- Tendering: % of purchases tendered.
- Tendering: Average number of bids.
- Delivery: Delivery slips vs purchase orders.

The continuity of the BBC programme and the timely delivery of supplies to the refugees depends on BBC receiving adequate funds in a timely fashion. Donor policy is for BBC to have adequate cash to cover expenditures one month ahead of the current one (i.e., a one-month reserve). In the past this has rarely happened and in many cases funds only arrive during the month in which expenditures are being made.

Figure 4.6 shows the percentage of funds available at the beginning of each month for that month's expenditures, for each of the last five years. So far in 2002 there has not been a single month where BBC has had a full one month reserve (>200% of current month expenditures) and for four months there were not even enough funds available at the beginning of the month for that month's expenditures (< 100%). The situation was extremely tight for most of the period, but somehow cash always arrived just before real problems occurred.

**Figure 4.5: BBC Cash Flow**

<b>Cash Available at Beginning of Month as Percentage of Funding Required for Expenditures (target 200%)</b>					
	<b>1998 (%)</b>	<b>1999 (%)</b>	<b>2000 (%)</b>	<b>2001 (%)</b>	<b>2002 (%)</b>
<b>January</b>	110	<b>44</b>	112	<b>3</b>	<b>91</b>
<b>February</b>	<b>25</b>	147	<b>84</b>	<b>88</b>	183
<b>March</b>	<b>82</b>	139	121	<b>25</b>	<b>73</b>
<b>April</b>	<b>25</b>	125	<b>44</b>	<b>66</b>	108
<b>May</b>	133	<b>86</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>June</b>	210	<b>36</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>75</b>
<b>July</b>	136	163	<b>77</b>	<b>64</b>	
<b>August</b>	175	<b>96</b>	<b>99</b>	116	
<b>September</b>	281	256	132	313	
<b>October</b>	<b>93</b>	279	<b>76</b>	448	
<b>November</b>	<b>45</b>	175	199	167	
<b>December</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>72</b>	172	
<b>Yearly Average</b>	112	135	87	128	90
<b>Months &lt; 100%</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Months &gt; 200%</b>	2	2	0	2	0

To maximise the cost effectiveness of the programme, BBC aims to get competitive pricing for all major supply items. During the first half of 2002 competitive tendering was undertaken for all purchases of rice, beans, cooking oil, charcoal, and bednets, or 75% of all commodity expenditures. A higher proportion of non-tendered items is purchased in the first half of the year, particularly fish paste and building materials, which represented a further 12% of purchases.

The introduction of formal tendering during the last few years has been very effective but its ongoing effectiveness will depend on BBC being able to maintain the ongoing interest of potential suppliers and receiving adequate competitive bids. The average number of bids received in the first half of 2002 was rice 4, beans 3, cooking oil 4, charcoal 3, and blankets 6. Competition remained very keen for this period and these figures are very similar to the last six months.

The efficiency of BBC's procurement procedures can also be measured by checking whether quantities received in camp were in accordance with purchase orders. The camp committees check deliveries and sign delivery slips for each consignment. BBC staff then check these against the purchase orders before payment. This involves a lot of paperwork and can be complicated when there are deliveries of multiple items. Summaries of these checks will be available in the second half of 2002.

### **Inputs 2: Distribution of goods by camp committees**

- Staff monitoring reports.
- Camp records.

The results of the regular staff monitoring visits are set out in r) Appendix C. The staff made 154 camp visits during the first half of 2002 an average of over 2.5 visits to each camp per month. They carried out 257 checks on seven different aspects of the camp supply and distribution system, including the camp records, and of these only 21 checks required some kind of follow-up or noted special attention.

**Once again, the results show that BBC is meeting its key objective of ensuring that the displaced persons receive adequate availability and access to food to sustain life. Performance Indicators for the provision of shelter and other relief items will be developed during the second half of 2002 for implementation in 2003. Indicators will also be developed for measuring BBC's effectiveness in meeting goals for gender and refugee participation, once these goals have been adopted.**

## 5. 2002 EXPENDITURES COMPARED WITH BUDGET

Actual programme expenditures for the first six months of 2002 compared with projected expenditures for the year presented in the last (February 2002) six-monthly report are set out below. This projection assumed an average refugee caseload in the camps in Thailand of around 133,000 and then-current price levels (with rice at baht 740 per 100 kgs).

Item	Revised (Feb) 2002 Projection (baht)	Quantity	Actual 6 month Expenditures (baht)	Quantity
<b>1. RICE</b>	<b>240,500,000</b>		<b>141,032,719</b>	
Rice (100 kg sacks)	192,500,000	256,000	117,223,775	156,764
Emergency	48,000,000	64,000	23,808,944	31,220
<b>2. OTHER FOOD</b>	<b>128,000,000</b>		<b>78,934,702</b>	
Fish/Prawn Paste (kgs)	14,100,000	1,192,000	10,140,570	837,601
Salt (kgs)	3,600,000	644,000	2,146,689	376,436
Mung Beans (kgs)	48,900,000	1,665,000	28,614,635	1,002,061
Cooking oil (lts)	36,900,000	1,482,000	23,498,859	893,514
Chillies (kgs)	9,200,000	155,000	5,566,495	89,748
Sardines (kgs)	5,300,000	102,000	4,481,472	94,425
Supplementary Feeding	10,000,000		4,485,982	
<b>3. RELIEF SUPPLIES</b>	<b>99,700,000</b>		<b>60,181,781</b>	
Cooking Fuel	78,500,000	9,652,000	52,258,379	6,417,771
Firewood	3,800,000	8,000	679,322	1,455
Bednets	4,400,000	48,000	4,233,401	48,717
Blankets	6,400,000	75,000	18,400	200
Mats	600,000	12,000	80,100	900
Clothing	6,000,000		2,912,179	
<b>4. MEDICAL</b>	<b>6,500,000</b>		<b>2,959,379</b>	
Medical	6,500,000		2,959,379	
<b>5. OTHER ASSISTANCE</b>	<b>44,000,000</b>		<b>31,506,002</b>	
Misc./Emergency	11,000,000		1,634,079	
Building Supplies	27,000,000		26,331,655	
School Support	2,000,000		1,200,000	
Thai Support	4,000,000		2,340,268	
<b>6. PROGRAMME SUPPORT</b>	<b>10,800,000</b>		<b>3,883,676</b>	
Relief Transport	5,000,000		580,498	
Quality Control, Consultants, Misc.	3,000,000		2,012,932	
Camp Administration	2,800,000		1,290,246	
<b>7. ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>32,300,000</b>		<b>12,180,880</b>	
Salaries/Office	27,000,000	Up to 24 staff	10,905,293	Up to 21 staff
Vehicle	4,800,000	10 vehicles	1,275,587	10 vehicles
Donors Meeting	500,000		0	
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>561,800,000</b>		<b>330,679,139</b>	

The total cost of the programme in the first half of 2002 was baht 330,679,139 (59%) compared with baht 561,800,000 projected for the whole year. It is normal for expenditures to be higher in the first half of the year because of stockpiling for the rainy season. Food expenditures were close to budget since refugee numbers (130,687 in Thailand at the end of June) and prices (rice averaged baht 750 during the period) were close to expectation. The annual budgets for bednets, building supplies and sardines were spent as these had to be delivered before the onset of the rains. Expenditure on charcoal was a little higher than expected and on firewood correspondingly low because of difficulties with the firewood experiment (see Section 2). Relief transport costs were lower than projected since these are now mostly included in the tender prices for supplies. Staff and vehicle costs were also low but anticipated second half expenditures will bring these in line with budget.

## 6. 2003 BUDGET COMPARED WITH PROJECTED 2002 EXPENDITURES

Budgeted expenditures for 2003 compared with revised estimates for 2002 are as follows:

Item	Revised 2002 Expenditures (Baht)	Quantity	Budget 2003 Expenditures (Baht)	Quantity
<b>1. RICE</b>	<b>243,323,000</b>		<b>281,082,000</b>	
Rice (100kgs)	195,323,000	252,000	229,082,000	265,000
Emergency	48,000,000	60,000	52,000,000	60,000
<b>2. OTHER FOOD</b>	<b>125,377,000</b>		<b>207,269,000</b>	
Fish Paste (kgs)	15,161,000	1,274,000	17,383,000	1,462,000
Salt (kgs)	3,347,000	592,000	3,425,000	610,000
Beans (kgs)	45,757,000	1,660,000	44,579,000	1,512,000
Blended Food (kgs)			80,233,000	1,783,000
Cooking Oil (ltrs)	37,376,000	1,453,000	29,803,000	1,197,000
Chillies (kgs)	9,755,000	161,000	13,256,000	225,000
Sardines (kgs)	4,481,000	94,000	8,190,000	158,000
Supplementary Feeding	9,500,000		10,400,000	
<b>3. RELIEF SUPPLIES</b>	<b>102,361,000</b>		<b>118,829,000</b>	
Charcoal (kgs)	85,497,000	10,558,000	96,221,000	11,875,000
Firewood (cm)	1,348,000	2,900	1,422,000	3,000
Bednets	4,323,000	49,700	4,732,000	52,000
Blankets	6,468,000	75,200	6,966,000	81,000
Mats	125,000	900	4,888,000	6,000
Clothing	4,600,000		4,600,000	
<b>4. MEDICAL</b>	<b>6,500,000</b>		<b>6,500,000</b>	
Medical	6,500,000		6,500,000	
<b>5. OTHER ASSISTANCE</b>	<b>44,000,000</b>		<b>66,000,000</b>	
Misc./Emergency	11,000,000		13,000,000	
Building supplies	27,000,000		47,000,000	
School Support	2,000,000		2,000,000	
Thai Support	4,000,000		4,000,000	
<b>6. PROGRAMME SUPPORT</b>	<b>7,850,000</b>		<b>7,700,000</b>	
Relief Transport	1,000,000		1,000,000	
Quality Control	1,600,000		1,600,000	
Consultants, Studies, Misc.	2,000,000		1,467,000	
Camp Administration	2,750,000		3,067,000	
Donors Meeting	500,000		500,000	
<b>7. ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>31,800,000</b>		<b>39,700,000</b>	
Salaries/Benefits	18,700,000	Up to 25 staff	24,600,000	Up to 31 staff
Vehicle	4,600,000	Up to 11 vehicles	6,900,000	Up to 15 vehicles
Office & Administration	8,500,000		8,200,000	
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>561,211,000</b>		<b>727,080,000</b>	

The revised expenditure projection for 2002 is baht 561,211,000 compared with 561,800,000 estimated in the last report. The differences are minor, reflecting actual prices and refugee numbers as of 30<sup>th</sup> June and the current stage of programme developments.

### Assumptions for 2003

**1) Refugee Numbers:** As described in Section 2, the number of new refugees entering the refugee camps in Thailand has been steady for the last three years, averaging close to 1,000 per month. But, as always, the number of new refugees arriving next year will depend on whether the situation changes in Burma and whether Thailand continues to grant them asylum. Although Aung San Suu Kyi was released in May and this was supposed to open the way to genuine political dialogue, the reality is that no real progress has yet been made. There is also widespread acknowledgement that the ethnic issue is the most sensitive problem of all and is unlikely to be addressed during the early stages of negotiation. The chances of any real political change during the next 18 months therefore still look remote and, as further described in Section 2, 2002 has probably been the worst year for Burmese Army abuses since 1997. SPDC seems determined to complete its campaign to control the border areas by destroying or relocating the entire rural population. The result is hundreds of thousands of Internally Displaced Persons who are all potential refugees.

The current Thai policy is not to allow any new arrivals, but the reality is that the border is long and porous and the situation is so desperate that new refugees continue to arrive. There are currently some 20,000 refugees in the camps who have either failed to meet the Thai admissions criteria of 'fleeing fighting' or have not yet even been considered for registration. Barring any uncharacteristic drastic action to send refugees back or refuse them entry, refugees are likely to go on arriving at the least at the same rate experienced during the last three years.

Purely for the purpose of budgeting, BBC is therefore assuming a continuing rate of new arrivals of 1,000 per month throughout the period. This would give an average caseload (mid-year 2003) of about 142,000 in the camps in Thailand. To these can be added at least 11,000 Mon refugees in resettlement camps across the border who will still need partial assistance. The total mid-2003 caseload is therefore assumed to be around 153,000. This increase in refugees alone would add about baht 31 million to the cost of supplies in the BBC programme.

**b) BBC Staff and Vehicles:** As mentioned in Section 2, the BBC Advisory Committee has recommended that BBC carry out an evaluation of its Management and Structure following its rapid expansion in recent years. It is clear that several new positions will have to be created to deal with the increasing workload. For budgeting purposes six new jobs are assumed:

1. A senior management position responsible for administration.
2. A middle management position to oversee implementation of BBC's gender policy
3. A middle management level position to oversee monitoring/evaluation/quality aspects of the programme.
4. A middle management level position to oversee human resources.
5. A middle management level position to coordinate IDP work.
6. A field position to provide support for nutrition work.

All of the three new Field Assistants recruited during 2002 need vehicles and so too does the BBC Nutritionist. Four new vehicles are therefore budgeted for 2003 as well as the replacement of the three oldest vehicles in the fleet.

Total administration costs will increase by about baht 8 million in 2003.

**c) Rice Prices:** BBC has enjoyed unusually low rice prices during the last three years but prices are now rising. Average prices for the second half of 2002 are around baht 860 per 100kgs compared with 775 last year. The rate of 860 is assumed for 2003 but prices could rise still further (the average price in 1998 was baht 1,065). This will add approximately baht 24 million to rice purchase costs (after allowing for reduced rations as per item d below) compared with 2002. Some other prices are also rising adding another baht 5 million or so to 2002 supply purchase costs.

**d) Nutrition Response:** To address the carbohydrate/protein imbalance and micronutrient deficiencies BBC provisionally proposes to introduce blended food to the food basket at a rate of 1.5 kgs/adult/month. The rice ration will be reduced from 16 to 15 kgs/adult/month and cooking oil from one litre to 0.7 litres/person/month. A new production unit will have to be set up for this item at an estimated baht 45/kg. This new food item will immediately become BBC's third highest expenditure after rice and cooking fuel. The net cost to the programme (allowing for compensating reductions in rice and oil) will be around baht 51 million. Details of this proposal are still being worked out and are subject to change. Currently the budget assumes that the blended food will be tested first in two camps for in February and March for border-wide distribution from April.

**e) Building Supplies:** As described in Section 2 and Appendix C, for 2003 BBC will attempt to standardise building material supplies for all camps. This will add baht 20 million to 2002 building supply costs.

**f) Other Assumptions:** The budget also assumes the standardisation of rations for chillies (for historic reasons some camps did not receive chillies), adding three million to the annual budget and a full distribution of sleeping mats (done every two years) at about baht 6 million. Sardines are budgeted to replace both beans and blended food at the end of the stockpile period for some camps, since these items cannot be stored longer than five or six months.

## 7. BBC FUNDING SITUATION

The first BBC Donors Meeting was convened in Amsterdam in 1996 and these have since been held annually in Stockholm (1997), London (1998), New York (1999), Oslo (2000) and Chiang Mai (2001). The next meeting is scheduled for Ottawa in October 2002.

One of the main objectives of the Donors Meetings is to raise the necessary funds for the following year based on BBC's preliminary budget, and to ensure that funds are scheduled for transfer throughout the year to avoid cash-flow difficulties. Generally speaking, the Donors Meetings on the day have not raised all the funding required, nor, indeed, solved the cash-flow problems, but they have established the necessary parameters for BBC to follow up with the Donors afterwards.

### a) 2002 Funding

**Table 7** summarises the funding situation for 2002. Total expenditures are currently estimated to be baht 561 million for the year, whereas baht 535 million has so far been received or pledged, i.e., BBC is currently facing a deficit of around baht 28 million for 2002.

Fortunately BBC did carry forward the budgeted reserve of baht 46 million from 2001 but unless new funds are received there will be inadequate working reserves for 2003.

### b) 2003 Funding Needs

The budget for 2003 is set out on in Section 6, totalling baht 727 million (or USD 17.3 million at current exchange rates), representing an increase of 30% over projected 2002 expenditures. The assumptions behind this budget have been explained and the main reasons for the increase set down. In summary, the increase over 2002 is made up as follows:

Item/Factor	Increase (baht million) over 2002 budget	Contribution to increase over 2002
Refugee numbers	31	6
Rice price	23	4
Other prices	5	1
Nutrition response	55	10
Administration	8	1
Building supplies	20	4
Sleeping mats, chillies	9	1
Other	15	3
<b>Total:</b>	<b>166</b>	<b>30%</b>

### c) Sensitivity of Assumptions

The budget presented is extremely sensitive to the main assumptions and in particular to the rice price and foreign currency exchange rate. The following Table shows how BBC costs have risen over the years but also how annual expenditures have stabilised or jumped when prices and exchange rates have stabilised or moved. It can be seen that annual increases of 50% and more have not been uncommon and in fact the average annual increase has been around 36% per annum!

The apparently stable situation during the last four years was actually quite unusual. Growing programme expenditures were masked by falling prices. Programme costs grew only 7% whilst refugee numbers increased 16%, staffing levels increased 50% and expenditures on such items as cooking fuel and building materials doubled. 2002 expenditures look set to increase by 14%, more accurately reflecting increasing programme inputs.

The much-increased budget for 2003 is the result of a combination of factors as outlined above but could be even higher if prices and exchange rates continue to go the 'wrong' way. During the last six months the Thai baht has been extremely volatile swinging from near 45 to the US dollar down almost to 40, and rice prices have started to rise. The Table shows how 2003 budget needs would change if the exchange rate and prices shifted to the levels experienced in 1998/9.

A combination of rice prices rising to 1998 levels and the baht strengthening to 1999 levels, would increase BBC funding needs from the projected USD 17.3 million to USD 20.5 million.

## Table 7

**Cost of BBC Programme in Thai baht and US Dollars: 1984 to 2003**

Year	BBC Expenditures (baht m)	% increase on previous year	Average Exchange rate (baht/USD)	BBC Expenditures (USD m)	Average Rice Price (baht)	Average population	Cost/refugee/ annum (baht)	Cost/refugee/ annum (USD)
1984	3		25	0.1		9,500	350	14
1985	4	33	25	0.2	390	12,800	330	13
1986	7	75	25	0.3	281	17,300	400	16
1987	13	86	25	0.5	372	19,100	690	28
1988	19	46	25	0.7	555	19,700	960	38
1989	22	16	25	0.9	595	21,200	1,050	42
1990	34	55	25	1.3	527	33,100	1,020	41
1991	62	82	25	2.5	556	49,600	1,250	50
1992	75	21	25	3.0	551	60,800	1,240	50
1993	86	15	25	3.4	496	69,300	1,240	50
1994	98	14	25	3.9	518	74,700	1,320	53
1995	181	85	25	7.3	700	84,800	2,140	86
1996	212	18	25	8.5	750	98,000	2,170	87
1997	292	38	40	7.3	798	115,000	2,530	63
1998	461	58	40	11.5	1,065	114,000	4,040	101
1999	481	4	38	12.7	920	114,000	4,220	111
2000	457	(10)	40	11.4	775	123,000	3,710	93
2001	494	8	44	11.2	730	133,000	3,715	84
2002*	561	14	42	13.4	775	143,000	3,923	94

\* projected

**2003 Budget**

<b>2003(a)</b>	<b>727</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>17.3</b>	<b>860</b>	<b>153,000</b>	<b>4,752</b>	<b>113</b>
2003(b)	727	29	38	19.1	860	153,000	4,752	125
2003(c)	780	39	42	18.6	1,065	153,000	5,098	122
2003(d)	780	39	38	20.5	1,065	153,000	5,098	134

- (a) Exchange rate and rice price as per appeal.  
 (b) 1998 Exchange rate.  
 (c) 1999 Rice price.  
 (d) 1998 Exchange rate, 1999 rice price.

To emphasise the difficulty of accurately projecting BBC's expenditure, the following table shows how expenditure forecasts in previous years have compared with actual expenditures. Since 1993 BBC has been making its first estimates of annual expenditures in August of the previous year, updating this in February of the year in consideration and then further refining this in again after the mid-year point, in August.

**BBC Expenditure Forecasts Compared with Actual Expenditures**

Year	First Budget (August)		1 <sup>st</sup> Revision (February)		2 <sup>nd</sup> Revision (August)		Actual Expenditures
	Baht (m)	% actual	Baht (m)	% actual	Baht (m)	% Actual	
2002	565		562		561		
2001	535	109	535	109	522	106	493
2000	524	115	515	113	465	102	457
1999	542	113	522	109	476	99	481
1998	330	72	494	107	470	102	461
1997	225	77	238	82	269	92	292
1996	170	83	213	104	213	104	204
1995	96	54	124	69	161	90	179
1994	85	87	93	95	91	93	98
1993	80	93	90	105	75	87	86
1992			75	99			76
1991			50	81			62
1990			24	71			34
<b>Average</b>		89%		95%		97%	

It can be seen that in some years budget estimates were seriously underestimated because of unforeseen events, although on average by not more than 11%. The accuracy of the revised forecasts obviously improves as events unfold.

## 8. FINANCIAL REPORTS FOR FIRST HALF OF 2002

The following tables summarise the BBC programme financial accounts for the period January to July 2002.

**Table 8.1** presents a summary of income, expenditures and balances for the period. This table is also produced monthly for the information of the BBC Board.

**Table 8.1a** gives a breakdown of programme expenditures by office; **8.1b** a breakdown of management expenses; **8.1c** a statement of stock held at the beginning and end of the period; **8.1c** a breakdown of the medical agencies' expenditure of BBC grants for supplementary feeding; and **9.1d** a statement of BBC's property.

**Tables 8.2a-c** present the information in Table 8.1 in a different format, allocating individual donor contributions to the main expenditure categories. Table **8.2a** covers the previous reporting period July to December 2001 as given in the last BBC Report. Table **8.2b** covers the current reporting period January to June 2002. Table **8.2c** shows total expenditures for the period July 2001 to June 2002. Funds accepted for specific purposes or which have to be expended fully within the current six-month period are listed separately as designated donations in Table 8.2a-c, with expenditures allocated appropriately. All undesignated donations including balances carried forward are assumed to carry a proportionate share of the remaining expenses incurred in each category. Should any donor require further breakdown beyond the expenditure categories given, this can be extracted by using the details given in Table 8.1.

BBC undertakes to expend all grants within a 12-month period but many donors require their grants to be spent by the end of the calendar year even if their funds are not received until nearly the end of the year. Last year BBC carried forward a balance close to an average one month's worth of expenditures in line with Donors Meeting policy. All of this balance was in fact spent before the end of January 2002. Tables 9.2b (8.2a in this report) in the July to December 2001 report therefore also included some expenditures made in January (shown as a separate line item) so that all funds received in 2001 could be allocated. This line item is now also included in Table 8.2b with new grants received in 2002 allocated to the balance of expenditures for this six-month period.

The BBC financial year is from July until June and BBC accounts are audited annually. The Financial Statements and Audit Report of KPMG Audit (Thailand) for the period 1<sup>st</sup> July 2001 through 30<sup>th</sup> June 2002 are presented in Appendix E.

## Table 8.1

## Table 8.1a

**Table 8.1b**

## Table 8.1C

**Table 8.1d & e**

## Table 8.2a

**Table 8.2b**

## Table 8.2c

## APPENDIX A

### THE BURMESE BORDER CONSORTIUM

#### a) 1984 Mandate/Organisation

In February 1984 the Ministry of Interior (MOI) invited Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) working with Indochinese refugees in Thailand to provide emergency assistance to around 9,000 Karen refugees who sought refuge in Tak Province. The situation was expected to be temporary and MOI stressed the need to restrict aid to essential levels only. It was emphasised that nothing should be done which might encourage refugees to come to Thailand or stay any longer than necessary. Thailand was prepared to offer these people temporary asylum on humanitarian grounds.

On 4<sup>th</sup>/5<sup>th</sup> March 1984, several Bangkok-based NGO representatives visited the border to assess the situation. The NGO representatives all happened to all be from Christian Agencies and observed that several French NGOs (MSF, MAP, MDM) were already setting up medical facilities, whilst the refugees themselves were cutting building materials from the surrounding forest to build their own houses. The immediate need was food supplies. The NGOs concluded that needs were quite small and, since it was expected that the refugees would return home at the beginning of the rainy season, it would be best to work together rather than try to divide the work up or to compete with each other. They agreed to open a bank account into which each agency would contribute funds and operate a programme under the name of the Consortium of Christian Agencies (CCA)

The refugees could not go back in the rainy season and the CCA became the main supplier of food and relief supplies to the refugees. It was an informal organisation and different NGOs joined and left, contributing funds and sharing in the decision making. The name was changed to the Burmese Border Consortium (BBC) in 1991 to become more inclusive, accessing a broader range of donors.

The NGOs involved in setting up the initial assistance programmes decided to work through the Karen Refugee Committee, which the Karen authorities had established to oversee the refugee population. In order to avoid duplication and competition, they established a subcommittee under the Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand (CCSDPT) to coordinate the relief programme. The CCSDPT Karen Subcommittee met for the first time in April 1984 and there have been monthly coordination meetings every since. All agencies providing assistance or interested in the situation are invited. The MOI sets policy and administrates the assistance programmes through CCSDPT.

#### b) 1990 Expansion/1991 Regulations

During 1989 the NGOs were approached by the Karenni Refugee Committee to assist Karenni Refugees who had fled fighting in Karenni State to Mae Hong Son Province. Early in 1990 Mon and Karen refugees also began to arrive in Kanchanaburi Province from Mon State. Another relief programme was set up at the request of the Mon National Relief Committee.

Assistance to each of the new groups was provided on the same basis as that already given to the Karen, through the respective refugee committees. In August 1990 the Agencies informed the MOI of these extended programmes and in November the name of the CCSDPT Karen Subcommittee was changed to the CCSDPT Burma Subcommittee.

In 1991 the NGOs sought formal permission from the Thai authorities to provide assistance to all of the ethnic groups throughout four border provinces. On 31<sup>st</sup> May 1991 the Agencies were given written approval to provide assistance under the authority of the Ministry of Interior and in accordance with their guidelines (see Appendix B). The guidelines confirmed earlier informal understandings, limiting assistance to food, clothing and medicine, restricting agency staff to the minimum necessary and requiring monthly requests to be submitted through the CCSDPT.

Three NGOs provided assistance under this agreement. The Burmese Border Consortium focused on food and relief item supplies. The BBC provided around 95% of all of these items and the Catholic Office for Emergency Relief and Refugees (COERR) provided most of the balance. Medicins Sans Frontiers (MSF) was the main medical agency working under agreement with the MOI.

### **c) 1994 Regulations**

During 1992 and 1993, a number of other CCSDPT Member agencies were providing services on the border in coordination with approved programmes, with the tacit approval of the MOI, but without a formal mandate. The CCSDPT Burma Subcommittee requested formal recognition of these programmes and official approval for an extension of services to include sanitation and education. At a meeting with NGOs, international organisations and embassies on 18<sup>th</sup> May 1994, MOI confirmed that sanitation and education services would be permitted and also announced that all agencies should re-submit their programmes for formal approval via CCSDPT.

An NGO/MOI Burma Working Group was set up and meetings were held to establish new operational procedures. NGOs were required to submit formal programme proposals, apply for border passes for authorised personnel, and to submit quarterly reports via the provincial authorities. All of the CCSDPT member agencies with current border activities were given approval for their programmes.

The programme approvals for 1995 included sanitation projects. The CCSDPT Burma Subcommittee carried out a survey of educational needs in 1995/6 and the first education project proposals were approved in 1997.

### **d) 1997 CCSDPT Restructuring and Emergency Procedures**

With the Indochinese refugee caseload almost gone, CCSDPT was restructured for 1997. CCSDPT was now principally engaged with Burmese refugees, making the Burma Subcommittee redundant. The former Burma Medical and Education Working Groups were upgraded to Subcommittee status to coordinate activities in these fields.

During 1997 refugees arrived in sensitive areas of Kanchanaburi, Ratchaburi and Prachuap Khiri Khan Provinces. NGOs were required to submit requests for monthly supplies for these areas for MOI approval in the normal way, but these now also had to be approved by the 9<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division of the Royal Thai 1<sup>st</sup> Army. The 9<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division is able to override MOI approval and on occasion exercises this prerogative.

### **e) 1998/99 Role for UNHCR**

During the first half of 1998 the Royal Thai Government made the decision to give UNHCR an operational role on the Burmese border for the first time and letters of agreement were exchanged in July. The UNHCR established a presence on the border during the second half of 1998 and became fully operational in the early part of 1999 with the opening and staffing of three offices in Mae Hong Son, Mae Sot and Kanchanaburi. The UNHCR role is principally one of monitoring and protection. It has no permanent offices in the camps, which continue to be administered by the Thai authorities themselves with the assistance of the Refugee Committees. The NGOs continue to provide and coordinate relief services to the refugee camps under bilateral agreements with RTG as before, although UNHCR may provide complementary assistance especially regarding camp relocations.

The structure of the relief assistance and location of CCSDPT member agency services are shown in the diagrams.

### **f) BBC Organisational Structure**

Various agencies have joined and left the Burmese Border Consortium over the years. Current members and the year in which they joined BBC are as follows:

TBMF	Thailand Baptist Missionary Fellowship (1984)
ZOA	Refugee Care Netherlands (1984)
JRS	Jesuit Refugee Service (1990)
DIAKONIA	DIAKONIA, Sweden (1999)
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid (2002)

The International Rescue Committee (IRC) withdrew from membership as of 31<sup>st</sup> December 2001.

The BBC structure was informal until 1996 with the member agencies directing the programme by consensus. With the programme growing inexorably and becoming increasingly dependent on governmental funding, a need for greater transparency and accountability led to BBC adopting a formal organisational structure for 1997. This structure was discussed and agreed at the first Donors Meeting held in Amsterdam on 2<sup>nd</sup>/3<sup>rd</sup> December 1996.

## **Structure of Relief Assistance**

## CCSDPT Map

The structure comprises:

- The Donors Meeting, being the overall representative body of BBC.
- An Advisory Committee, elected from the Donors at the Donors Meeting, representing the Donors Meeting between meetings.
- The BBC Board, being the five member agencies responsible for overall management of the programme.
- The BBC Director appointed by the Board and responsible for implementation of the programme.

Full details are set down in the "Structure and Regulations of BBC" available from the BBC office.

The Donors Meeting meets once per year, the Advisory Committee meets between Donors Meetings to follow up on concerns of the Meeting and to assist the Board on outstanding problems. The Board meets monthly to oversee the programme.

The BBC shares an office with CCSDPT at 12/5 Convent Road. The BBC Board and Staff are listed at the beginning of this report. The field coordinators traditionally worked from offices at their homes with some storage space for emergency relief items, but separate offices were opened in Mae Sot and Mae Sariang in 1998 and in Kanchanaburi in 2000.

### **g) Funding Sources**

BBC received or is expecting to receive funds from the following sources in 2002:

ACT Netherlands	DanChurchAid, Denmark
Australian Baptist World Aid	Diakonia
Baptist International Ministries	ICCO
Baptist Missionary Society ,UK	Ireland Aid
Baptist Union of Sweden	International Rescue Committee
Bread for the World, Germany	International Refugee Trust
CAFOD, UK	Inter-Pares, Canada
CARITAS Australia	Jesuit Refugee Service
CARITAS Hong Kong	Misereor
CARITAS Japan	Mission Ministries
CARITAS Switzerland	National Council of Churches in Australia
Christian Aid, UK	Norwegian Church Aid
Church World Service, USA	United Society for Propagation of the Gospel
Cooperative Baptist Fellowship	ZOA Refugee Care Netherlands

The Governments of Australia, Canada, Denmark, European Union, Great Britain, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, The Netherlands and USA contribute over 85% of BBC's funds. These funds are all channelled through these Donors. Appendix D sets out details of funding received from all Donors since 1984.

Until mid-1997 the BBC member agencies transferred funds received from the Donors to a programme account held by TBMF, but in 1997 BBC was able to open its own bank accounts. Donations are now made direct to the BBC Bangkok account.

### **h) BBC Bank Account**

The BBC bank account for grant transfers is as follows:

Siam Commercial Bank	Branch Ref No: 14-064
Surawong 2 Branch	Name: Burmese Border Consortium
141 Sakulthai Bldg-Surawong Tower	Account #: 064-2-15287-3
Surawong Road, Bangrak	Swift ID Code: SICOTHBK
Bangkok 10500, Thailand	

The BBC Tax ID number is: 4-1070-5787-5

#### **i) Financial Statements and Programme Updates**

The BBC produces monthly income and expenditure statements and a summary report every six months. The BBC financial year is 1 July to 30 June and accounts are audited annually. The Auditors' report for the period 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002 is presented in Appendix E.

The six-monthly reports include a narrative explaining the major events during the period. However many donors require more regular information, especially during emergencies. Situation updates are sent out by e-mail and five were issued in the first half of 2002.

#### **j) Programme Philosophy**

The BBC adopted formal aims and objectives at the first Donors Meeting in December 1996 and these were revised at the Oslo Donors Meeting in September 2000. The revised goal and objectives are set out at the beginning of this report. These are currently again under review and it is planned to present another revised version incorporating gender and refugee participation at the 2002 Donors Meeting in Ottawa.

#### **k) Coordination with Refugee Committees**

The BBC provides all assistance in coordination with the refugee committees of each of the three main ethnic groups: the Karen Refugee Committee based in Mae Sot; the Karenni Refugee Committee based in Mae Hong Son; and the Mon Relief and Development Committee (formerly the Mon National Relief Committee until 1999) based in Sangkhlaburi. Each of these three committees report to BBC each month recording assistance received both from BBC and other sources, refugee population statistics, and issues of concern.

## APPENDIX B

### MINISTRY OF INTERIOR REGULATIONS

31<sup>st</sup> May 1991

(Approximate Translation)

Re: The provision of assistance to Burmese Minorities who have fled into Thailand.

To: CCSDPT

This is in regard to the CCSDPT's request for permission for humanitarian agencies to provide medicines, food and items of necessity to minorities of Burma who have fled into Thailand for reasons related to human rights, in the border areas of Mae Hong Son, Tak, Kanchanaburi and Prachuap Khiri Khan Provinces.

The National Security Council raised this matter in a meeting of the governmental bodies concerned on 25<sup>th</sup> April 1991. It was decided at the meeting that the Ministry of Interior would outline a procedure for the supervision of relief agencies in the provision of assistance to minorities, according to guidelines established.

Having considered the matter, the MOI has come up with the following procedure:

1. Private organisations that intend to provide assistance to Burmese minorities in Thai-Burmese border areas in Mae Hong Son, Tak, Kanchanaburi and Prachuap Khiri Khan Province must submit a proposal to the MOI through the CCSDPT every time (assistance is given).
2. The CCSDPT will submit proposals to the MOI requesting permission for relief agencies to provide assistance. The following details are to be included.
  - 2.1 The quantities of goods to be provided.
  - 2.2 The number and names of staff members involved.
  - 2.3 The exact period during which the assistance is to be provided, including the correct month, day and year.
3. The MOI will consider the requests and instruct the Office of the Governor as follows:
  - 3.1 To assess the suitability of the location in which activities are to be carried out. The location must be inside Thailand. Activities must be carried out with caution and in suitable areas. In areas which are unsafe for relief agency staff, or where the security of Thailand is threatened, the MOI may withhold permission to proceed.
  - 3.2 Assistance may be given to civilians only and there is to be no publicity.
  - 3.3 The social and psychological effects on (citizens of) the Kingdom of Thailand in the areas concerned must be taken into consideration. If necessary, assistance will have to be provided to the Kingdom of Thailand as well.
  - 3.4 Assistance is to be limited to food, clothing and medicines. Medicines and medical supplies must pass the inspection of the Provincial Health Office for determination of their suitability.
  - 3.5 Relief agency staff are to be kept to a minimum and will not be allowed to reside on site. In cases where large numbers of personnel are required, there should be coordination with the Provincial Office so that Provincial Office employees may be included.
4. The MOI will inform the CCSDPT of its decision every time (a request is made), after which time permission will be granted for direct coordination with the Provincial Office.
5. If any relief agency fails to follow the steps outlined above, the MOI will immediately revoke permission to proceed.

Respectfully,

Nai Chamnan Pochana  
Assistant Deputy Minister  
For the Deputy Interior Ministry

## APPENDIX C

### THE RELIEF PROGRAMME

#### a) Royal Thai Government Regulations

Each month the BBC submits lists to MOI, detailing items to be delivered to each camp the following month, including expected delivery dates. Copies are forwarded to the Provincial and District Authorities. The MOI sends approval to the BBC and to the Provincial Offices, which in turn notify the District Authorities.

Under regulations introduced in 1994 the BBC submits the overall programme to MOI for approval annually. The BBC submits quarterly programme reports to the Provincial Offices and six-monthly reports to the MOI. All BBC staff carry camp passes issued by the MOI.

#### b) Food Rations

The refugee diet is traditionally rice, salt, and fish paste, supplemented with leaves and roots gathered from the forest, plus any vegetables that can be cultivated. For many years the refugees were not entirely dependent on the relief programme for food and showed commendable willingness to be self-sufficient where possible. Their political organisations still controlled territory on the Burmese side of the border, traded on the black market, and grew crops in some areas. Some refugees were also able to get low-paid seasonal work in Thailand, forage in the surrounding forest, keep small kitchen gardens and raise a limited amount of livestock in the camps. At the beginning of the relief programme in 1984, BBC's aim was to cover only around 50 percent of the staple diet needs. At this level life in the camps remained simple and poor, but not inconsistent with standards in their former villages, or in Thai villages in the area.

Over the years the ethnic groups lost their territory to the Burmese Army and the security situation deteriorated. The refugee camps became subject to tighter controls by the Thai authorities and it became increasingly difficult for the refugees to be self-sufficient. Rations were gradually increased and by the mid-1990's it had become necessary to supply 100 percent of basic food needs. During 1997 even stricter controls were placed on the camps for security reasons and, in some cases, it became impossible for refugees to leave the camps to forage or get work. NGOs became concerned that the refugees were no longer getting an adequate diet and in October 1997 the BBC commissioned a rapid assessment of the nutritional adequacy of the rations.

BBC rations were compared with the new WFP/UNHCR guidelines for planning estimates for populations that recommended providing a minimum of 2,100 Kcal per person per day based on an average family, with no differentiation for age. The conclusion was that the standard food basket should include mung beans and cooking oil for all the camps to ensure the minimum average of 2,100 kcal, and this was implemented during the first half of 1998.

The current standard monthly BBC rations are:

Rice	16 kg/adult: 8 kg/child <5 years
Fish Paste	1 kg/person
Salt	330 g/person
Mung Beans	1.5 kg/adult: 750 gm/child <5 years
Cooking Oil	1 lt/adult: 500 ml/child <5 years

There are some variations in the rations given to individual camps based on local preferences, but the above composition provides 2,250 kcals per person day.

The BBC food basket was designed to cover only the basic energy and protein needs of the refugees and does not ensure adequate provision of many important micronutrients. It was assumed in the past that the refugees supplemented BBC rations by buying, bartering, growing or foraging to make up for any other needs. But as the refugees have become more aid-dependent the BBC recognised that some segments of the population at least, may be at risk for deficiencies.

In 2000 it was decided therefore to conduct a food consumption/nutrition status survey and this was initiated in Mae La camp in February 2001. A second survey was conducted in Karenni Camp 2 in November/December and in May 2002 a rapid nutrition survey was carried out in Tham Hin, Ban Don Yang and Umpiem Mai camps. The results have shown quite consistently that the ration currently provided is proportionately too high in carbohydrates at the expense of protein and fat, and low in many micronutrients. The refugees are not able to adequately

supplement the BBC ration with other foods to compensate and are much more dependent on BBC ration food than was previously assumed.

BBC is currently recommending changes to the food basket, which will include the addition of blended food, probably with some reduction in rice and cooking oil. The MOI and Donors will consider this for possible implementation in 2003.

BBC has initiated collaboration with the medical agencies to expand nutrition surveillance activities in the camps, and the surveillance activities will be reflected in border-wide statistics.

### **c) Supplementary Feeding**

Currently the medical agencies run supplementary feeding programmes for three targeted vulnerable groups: malnourished children; pregnant and lactating women; and tuberculosis patients. The budget for ingredients is provided by the BBC and includes rice, eggs, dried fish, beans, sugar, milk powder, vegetable oil, and fresh fruits and vegetables. The BBC provides/reimburses the basic supplies for the supplementary feeding programmes run by AMI, ARC, IRC, MHD and MSF.

The supplementary feeding programmes were evaluated by a consultant provided by Dutch Interchurch Aid in May 1998 and the main conclusions were that the programmes and target groups were justified, the current food items covered by BBC were appropriate and phasing out was not yet appropriate. It was felt not necessary to include other vulnerable groups at that time. The evaluation noted different approaches adopted by the medical agencies and, whilst not advocating any particular model, recommended them to jointly review their different protocols and harmonise their programmes within reasonable boundaries. It also recommended greater interchange between agencies to share experiences and tabled a suggested new format for reporting the programmes.

Since late 2000, the BBC Nutritionist has been working with the Medical agencies to follow up on the evaluation recommendations. Further study showed that there were significant variations in both the quantities of foods provided and the criteria for entrance into and exit from the programmes. Standardised entrance and exit criteria for the target groups were recommended and more uniform feeding protocols have now been introduced. More comprehensive, reporting forms are now being used by the medical agencies. Since the evaluation, the majority of them have phased out wet feeding centres for malnourished children and integrated the programs into their Reproductive Health activities. Thus, supplementary feeding programs for malnourished children have already been 'exited'. The BBC Nutritionist and medical agencies have agreed that the feedings targeting pregnant and lactating women and tuberculosis patients are justified and should be continued.

Figure 4.2 presented in Section 4 shows that malnutrition rates in the camps, by feeding enrolment, remain extremely low. These figures should accurately reflect malnutrition rates for those camps that conduct ongoing surveillance (e.g., monthly weighing for children <5). However, the nutrition survey results show that malnutrition rates are higher than feeding enrolment figures in Mae La camp, indicating the need for ongoing surveillance and investigation into the cause.

### **d) Blankets, Bednets and Sleeping Mats**

The main relief supplies are bednets and blankets. With malaria and respiratory diseases being major health problems, these items are essential. They have to be supplied and replaced on a regular basis because they wear out rapidly with heavy use and rough conditions in crowded bamboo houses. Major distributions are usually made once each year.

Impregnated bednets were introduced in 1997, following recommendations made by the Sho Khlo Malaria Research Unit (SMRU) and the CCSDPT Health Subcommittee. Malaria transmission rates in the camps have fallen dramatically since then and the use of impregnated nets was phased out of Tak and Mae Hong Son camps during 2000 and 2001. Impregnated nets are now only distributed in Tham Hin and Ban Don Yang camps and the Mon resettlement sites.

Sleeping mats were traditionally supplied only when requested by the Refugee Committees. During 1998 it was agreed that these mats should be distributed more methodically to ensure that all refugees use them in conjunction with the bednets. It was noted that households not using them were vulnerable to mosquitoes entering the nets from underneath their houses. Household surveys were conducted and additional distributions undertaken. The current policy is to carry out a full distribution of sleeping mats every two years and the next full distribution will be in 2003.

The normal distribution rate is one blanket for every two refugees, one family size bednet and one sleeping mat per three persons. These items are usually also given to all new refugees on arrival as necessary.

Other emergency needs are addressed from time to time particularly during camp evacuations, fighting and camp relocations. Items have included plastic sheeting, water drums, cooking and eating utensils.

### e) Cooking Utensils

The refugees traditionally have taken care of their own miscellaneous household needs but this has become increasingly problematic as their ability to work and forage has become very limited. By the end of 2000 it was observed that there were not enough cooking pots in the camps and many households were using very old ones. A distribution of pots was made to all households early in 2001 at the rate of one pot per family with a larger size pot provided for families with more than five people.

### f) Building Materials

In the past, building materials were not usually supplied, although roofing was given when camps had to be moved out of season and the materials were difficult to find. In 1997, however, the authorities began to prohibit the cutting of bamboo in some areas and BBC started to provide all essential construction materials for the new sites created during camp consolidations.

Early in 2000 the Thai authorities also asked BBC to supply materials for housing repairs in all camps since they were concerned that the refugees were still depleting the local forests. During the year bamboo and eucalyptus poles were supplied to most camps and thatch or roofing leaves to some. During 2001 BBC increased the amount of materials supplied and extended distributions to all camps, but there were still inconsistencies and difficulties obtaining good and consistent quality materials in some areas. In response to the protection workshops BBC is committed to providing sufficient materials for building new houses and repairs. New sources of supply are being identified and for 2003 BBC hopes to introduce standard rations for all camps as follows:

#### 1. New Houses

Material	Standard House (1 to 5 pers)	Large House (>5 persons)
Eucalyptus poles	12 poles: 8 large, 4 small	18 poles: 12 large, 6 small
Bamboo	200 poles: 100 large, 100 small	300 poles: 150 large, 150 small
Roofing	300 leaves or 100 thatch	450 leaves or 150 thatch

#### 2. Repairs to Old Houses

Material	Standard House (1 to 5 pers)	Large House (>5 persons)
Bamboo	50 poles: 25 large, 25 small	75 poles: 40 large, 35 small
Roofing	100 leaves or 30 thatch	150 leaves or 50 thatch

### g) Clothing

Sweaters and quilts have been received from Lutheran World Relief (LWR) in recent years and World Concern has sent shipments of used clothing.

There is a growing need for clothing as the refugees become more aid dependent and since 2001 BBC has been trying to ensure regular distributions. Two new sources have been established with good quality jackets/sweaters received from Japan through the Shanti Volunteer Association (SVA) and BBC is supporting a new longyi weaving project organised by the women's organisations (Burmese style wrap-around 'skirt', worn by both men and women). It is hoped that SVA will be able to maintain annual shipments of jackets/sweaters and BBC will supply thread and funds for the women's groups to make one longyi for every woman and man in alternative years. In 2002 the project will have made one longyi for every woman in the camps and next year they will be made for men.

If regular shipments can be received from LWR and SVA this will provide each refugee with two items of clothing each year and the longyi project will augment this further. Unfortunately though, it is still very difficult to clear the imports through the Thai bureaucracy and impossible to guarantee arrival in time for the cold season. SVA's shipment intended for the 2001/2 cold season but was not released from customs until January 2002.

It is possible, however, to buy good quality used clothing at reasonable prices in Thailand and it is planned in future to buy at least one item per refugee should overseas shipments be delayed. This should not be necessary in 2002.

## **h) Cooking Fuel**

When camps started to be consolidated in 1995, BBC was asked to supply cooking fuel to Mae La camp in order to lessen environmental damage caused by refugees gathering wood from the surrounding forest. After researching alternative types of cooking fuel, BBC began supplying Mae La with compressed sawdust logs in September 1995. Similar logs had been used in other refugee camps in Thailand.

BBC experimented with sawdust log rations and gradually increased them to 11 kg/person/month by the end of 1997. The logs became a major expense and during 1998 BBC tried out new forms of logs, principally charcoal sawdust logs and bamboo charcoal. These were well received by the refugees and more efficient to use. In Karenni Camp 3 the Karenni Refugee Committee also taught refugees to manufacture their own charcoal logs using rice husk ash and off-cut bamboo ash.

With increasing concerns for the environment and restrictions on refugee movements, more and more camps were supplied with cooking fuel each year and, since early 2000, all camps have been provided with 'full' rations.

Cooking fuel became BBC's second largest expenditure after rice. But even after 'full' rations had been introduced to all camps in 2000, the Thai authorities still complained that the refugees were destroying the local forests and asked BBC to increase the rations by as much as 100%. BBC decided that it needed expert advice to determine optimum rations more scientifically and to help assess the efficiency of the available products.

In April/May 2000 UNHCR commissioned a consultant to work in cooperation with BBC to study the needs for cooking fuel in the camps, how it was being used, what alternatives were available and how the rations might be adjusted. The consultant concluded that there was a need for increased rations but that improving fuel quality, supplying efficient cooking stoves throughout the border and improving cooking techniques could reduce the overall need. He also recommended experimenting with much cheaper, commercially available firewood. Meanwhile the consultant recommended an increase in the ration by an average of 7%, to be simultaneously implemented by introducing variable rations according to family size which BBC had already introduced in some of the camps.

BBC is now distributing variable rations according to the family size. A family of two people receives an average 10 kgs per person per month, whereas a family of five people receives an average of seven kgs per person. Overall the average ration is just over seven kgs/person per month. The energy content of all charcoal is now tested and the most energy efficient selected.

An experiment was conducted with firewood in Tham Hin camp in 2000/1 where 50% of energy requirements were supplied with charcoal and 50% with firewood. This was very successful. The firewood proved acceptable to the camp committee, refugees and local Thai authorities and saved BBC about 34% on fuel costs compared with supplying 100% charcoal. During 2002 BBC increased the firewood proportion of fuel in Tham Hin to 70:30 at the request of MOI and also extended the experiment to Umpiem Mai and Karenni Camp 3 to test the availability and acceptance of firewood in other provinces.

Unfortunately the extension of this experiment has not been as successful. Tham Hin residents complain that the firewood component there is too high, and cost-effective sources have yet to be found for the more remote camps in Tak and Mae Hong Son provinces. The residents of Umpiem Mai complain of fire risk due to high winds experienced in that camp. Experimentation will continue but the scope for introducing firewood is likely to be less than originally anticipated.

## **i) Educational Supplies**

The refugees sustain all community activities themselves including schools from kindergarten through to high school. Until 1997 BBC made annual donations of basic school supplies for the teachers and pupils, mostly purchased by ZOA. During 1995/6 the BBC staff organised a survey of educational needs in the Mon, Karenni and Karen camps on behalf of the CCSDPT. The results of the survey were presented to the MOI in August 1996 setting out recommendations for extended education services for the refugees. Now there are eleven NGOs, including two BBC Members (ZOA, JRS), providing education services in the camps and ZOA distributes school supplies under its own programme.

## **j) Emergency Stock**

BBC's aims to have staff in the area within 24 hours of any emergency situation such as an influx of new arrivals, flood or fire damage. An assessment will then be carried out where possible (i.e., where there is no security risk) in coordination with the medical agencies, a member of the refugee community and the local Thai Authorities.

In order to be able to 'respond' quickly to an emergency, it was agreed in June 2002, that an 'emergency stock' of basic non-food items will be maintained as follows:

Area	To Cover No. of families	Blankets	Bednets	Plastic Sheeting	Plastic Rolls	Cooking Pots 26 cm	Cooking Pots 28 cm
Mae Hong Son	100	500	200	100	25	100	100
Mae Sariang	100	500	200	100	25	100	100
Tak	400	2,000	750	200	50	400	400
Kanchanaburi	100	500	100	100	25	100	100

### k) Refugee Demographics

The supplies are distributed to all camp residents. The breakdown by age and sex reported by the Karen, Mon and Karenni Committees in June 2002 was as follows:

Group	Families	Adult*		Children		Total
		Male	Female	Male	Female	
Karen	17,753	31,411	30,131	18,885	18,070	98,497
Mon	1,938	3,144	3,370	1,803	1,920	10,237
Karenni	4,311	9,386	8,359	1,425	1,523	20,693
Total	24,002	43,941	41,860	22,113	21,513	129,427

\* For Karen and Mon, this is over 12 years old, for Karenni over 14 years old.

### l) Assistance to Thai Communities

It has always been the policy of BBC to provide assistance to Thai communities in the vicinity of the refugee camps where there are real needs. This is in recognition of the fact that there are poor communities which do not have access to any other assistance and which may feel neglected when support is given to refugees in their area. Assistance given was ad hoc, but over the years the BBC provided educational supplies to Thai schools, distributed blankets during the cool season, and assisted many times with flood relief. The BBC also provided compensation to local communities affected by the location of the refugee camps in their area, and assisted the local Thai authorities with the cost of repairing roads near the refugee camps.

The number of requests for assistance by Thai communities and local Thai authorities increased dramatically in 1998, partly because local administration budgets were slashed due to Thailand's economic crisis. In 1999 the BBC established a more formal but still general policy for responding to such requests. The policy specifies potential beneficiaries for assistance including: disasters and emergencies in the border Provinces; communities directly affected by the refugee populations; other border communities whose standard of living is equal or less than that of the refugees; and Thai agencies providing security or assistance which are not adequately funded by the authorities. The policy also sets out procedures for submitting requests.

Total assistance given to Thai communities during the first half of 2002 was baht 2,340,268 as detailed in Table 8.1a. Most of this, baht 2,268,842 was given to local Thai authorities, mainly in the form of rice to border personnel. Baht 47,806 was also spent on thatch for Thai village houses destroyed in a storm near Mae La camp.

A significant proportion of the used clothing distributions is also given to affected Thai communities.

### m) Purchasing Procedures/Tendering

Traditionally, all food items were purchased in the border provinces, usually monthly, but sometimes rice was purchased in advance to secure good prices. The BBC monitored daily rice prices published in Bangkok, checked the local markets and compared the prices paid at the different locations along the border. All of the commodities BBC used were everyday items readily available in all markets and it was relatively straightforward to informally check value for money. Formal competitive quotations were obtained only occasionally when requested by large donors. Generally these confirmed that local suppliers could offer the lowest prices and the best service, mainly because frequent deliveries were required to many small camps with constantly changing road conditions and security situations.

The BBC programme was quite small in the early years but as it grew, it became very significant by local standards. Over time the better local suppliers geared themselves up to BBC's needs. In some cases they bought their own transportation and extended their storehouses. They got to know the local officials and became familiar with the topography. This enabled them to help solve administration blockages and to respond rapidly to frequent emergencies, getting their supplies to remote areas at very short notice. In some cases the suppliers organised annual road repairs into the camps at the end of the rainy season to enable their trucks to get in. In short, some local suppliers built up their operations to meet BBC's needs and had overwhelming advantages over other potential suppliers from a distance.

During 1999, however, mainly in response to tighter ECHO grant conditions, the BBC adopted formal bidding/contract procedures for rice and mung bean supplies in Tak Province. And in 2000 tendering was introduced for rice, mung beans, cooking oil and cooking fuel in all provinces. Bidding was open to all interested suppliers and it became more realistic for new suppliers to compete because there were far fewer camps to serve with better road access.

During 2001 BBC engaged an EURONAIID consultant to assist in upgrading its tendering and contracting procedures to meet exacting ECHO standards, including international bidding and the opening of bids before a tendering committee. Currently BBC is calling tenders on a regular six-monthly basis where camps are accessible all year round and separately for the rainy season where remote camps have to be stockpiled.

Miscellaneous supplies such as bamboo, roofing and cooking utensils are usually purchased locally, but large orders such as bednets, blankets, sleeping mats, (and cooking pots in 2001) are placed annually in Bangkok. Where possible, tenders are solicited from a minimum of three suppliers.

Regular tenders are now invited for rice, mung beans, cooking oil and charcoal and altogether BBC is now tendering for almost 90% of all goods purchased. Most contracts have still so far been let to local companies. Experience with 'outside' suppliers has generally been problematic and BBC has adopted a policy to only award new suppliers with contracts to the less sensitive camps as a way of testing their ability.

#### **n) Transportation**

Transportation costs are included in the price of all food supplies. In Tak Province transportation is usually by ten-wheel truck with a capacity of 400 50-kg rice sacks. For the other camps which are less accessible, transportation is usually by six-wheel trucks or 4-wheel drive pick-ups. The BBC staff organises the necessary permits from the local Thai authorities.

#### **o) Delivery/Storage**

The BBC itself does not store food. The suppliers keep their own stock and delivery is made direct to stores in the camps. BBC supplies building materials for the stores and the refugee Camp Committees are responsible for their construction and maintenance. The frequency of delivery varies by location. For Mae La camp in Tak Province, delivery is every two weeks, but for most of the other camps, delivery is usually monthly during the dry season. During the rainy season remote camps have to be stockpiled for up to seven months because they become inaccessible by truck. BBC staff arrange and check deliveries to camps. The Refugee Camp Committee check weights and quality on delivery, setting aside any deficient items. Delivery slips are carried by the truck drivers which are signed by the committee and returned to the BBC field office for checking. Delivery schedules are designed to ensure that new supplies arrive before the refugees have consumed the previous deliveries, with sufficient allowance for possible delays due to road conditions, breakdowns and other emergencies.

#### **p) Distribution**

The Refugee Camp Committees are responsible for the distribution of goods. Food distributions were traditionally organised by men because they had to carry 100 kgs sacks. However, during 2001, 50 kg sacks were introduced to all camps and already women have been noticeably drawn into the unloading and distribution process. Distributions of household items, e.g., pots, bednets and clothing are often conducted with the assistance of women's organisations, teachers or health workers. Each family has a ration book stating their entitlement, and they are called to the delivery point for distribution. Whilst most are male-headed households, it is the women who usually collect the BBC rations. Amounts distributed are recorded on the camp records and on the ration cards.

## q) Quality Control/Returns

Substandard supplies rejected by the camp committees are returned to the suppliers for replacement. Since the Refugee Committees are very familiar with the quality of supplies to be expected, generally in the past it was considered that appearance, smell and taste were adequate to assess quality. Rice and other food samples were submitted for testing by an independent inspection company only on an occasional basis.

However, independent quality control inspections are required under ECHO grant terms and in 2001 an independent inspection company was employed to check all rice, mung bean, cooking oil and charcoal deliveries to Mae La and Umpiem Mai camps. This involved checking the weight, packaging and quality of 4 to 10% of every sack/container of rice, mung beans, cooking oil and charcoal.

The introduction of quality controls presented many logistical problems to begin with but these were soon resolved. The cost involved works out at about 1% of the purchase price of supplies inspected. Although most of the supplies easily pass the inspections, the checks have proven to be a useful safeguard, particularly when new suppliers are introduced and for stockpiling where the camp committees only check quality at the time of distribution. Checking every consignment however seemed excessive and, in 2002, 50% of all ECHO consignments are being inspected. Random inspections are also being made on all other contracts for rice, beans, cooking oil and charcoal border-wide. Additional inspections are made when problems are identified.

## r) Camp Administration

In the early years the Karen Refugee Committee took responsibility for all camp affairs and BBC provided no support for the Camp Administrations. As territory was lost and trading was hit, BBC agreed to allow the committees to retain some of the used sacks and containers for resale. The proceeds were then used to support administration expenses such as stationary, photocopying, plastic sheets and torch batteries for night security patrols, funerals, commemoration days, travel costs to town, entertainment of visitors and Thai authorities, camp festivals and social welfare for vulnerable families/individuals. As the amounts became more significant, BBC took responsibility for selling back the rice sacks and allocated funds to the committees. By 2000 about 70% of the credit received was given to the Camp Committees for their operating expenses.

With the introduction of polypropylene sacks in 2001, which have a resale value of only about one baht compared with up to 20 baht for a jute sack, this source of revenue drastically declined. From 2002 BBC is covering these on a cash basis at a standard rate of baht 1.8 per refugee per month for each camp. This rate will be reviewed based on expenditure reports submitted by the camp committees.

## s) Monitoring

The BBC staff monitor refugee population numbers, delivery and distribution of supplies on a continuous basis. This is done by regular crosschecks between information supplied by the refugee committees, the camp leaders and informal discussions with the refugees themselves, plus observation of deliveries, distribution and supplies in storage. A monitoring recording system has been in use since 1995 which provides a summary for each camp, detailing checks made on deliveries, quality, weight, distribution, camp recording systems, unusual events and frequency of staff visits. This has been constantly upgraded and can be summarised as follows:

### Summary of BBC Monitoring Process

Operation	Information Required	Primary Source	Verification by BBC
Calculating food required	Camp population & Population structure	Camp leaders	Periodic house counts.
Procurement & Tendering	Bids from > 3 companies. Cost, Quality & Delivery Conditions	Rice shops, Newspapers, BBC staff	Prices monitored in Bangkok by BBC.
Delivery	Quality & quantity	Camp leaders, Suppliers	Inspection by SGS prior to loading &/or samples taken by BBC Staff for testing. Delivery notes, etc.
Storage	State of stores. Losses to pests	Camp leaders	Periodic visual inspection.
Distribution	Amount distributed. Stock in hand	Camp registers, household ration books, summary forms	Periodic inspection of records including ration books. Periodic household interviews. Random weight checks at distribution points.

During the six month period from January to June 2002 the BBC field staff made 154 camp monitoring visits to the 10 camps in Thailand, an average of over 2.5 visits to each camp per month. The average number of visits was 15 per camp with a maximum of 35 visits (Mae La) and a minimum of five (Karenni Camp 5). Details of the visits and the checks made for this period are as follows:

Camp	Number of visits	Distribution		Delivery		Store		Camp Records		Other Checks*	
		#	x	#	x	#	x	#	x	#	x
Camp 2	9	4	0	5	0	6	1	2	0	4	0
Camp 3	10	1	0	2	0	1	0	2	0	2	0
Camp 5	5	4	0	0	0	4	0	3	0	6	1
Mae Kong Kha	16	6	0	1	0	5	2	4	0	11	0
Mae Ra Ma Luang	8	3	0	2	0	4	1	2	0	0	0
Mae La	35	7	0	3	0	2	0	7	0	9	0
Umpiem Mai	25	0	0	3	0	4	0	9	0	5	0
Nu Po	8	3	0	3	0	4	0	5	0	2	1
B Don Yang	20	14	0	8	0	16	0	15	0	13	11
Tham Hin	18	5	0	7	0	4	0	2	0	2	4
<b>Total:</b>	<b>154</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>17</b>

\* Other checks include quality, weight and ration book checks made before the formal Control Checks were introduced in April (see below)

#	Total number of checks	236
X	Number of checks requiring follow-up or special attention	21

In April, BBC started carrying out formal control checks of the distribution system to ensure that refugees are receiving their ration entitlement and to provide data for the performance indicators. The preparatory work for this was undertaken in 2001, entailing upgrading and standardising camp records and then testing the new checks in coordination with the refugees committees. The control checks recorded from April 2002 were as follows:

Camp	Rice Sacks Rejected (1)	House Visits Made (2)		Ration Books Checked (3)		Average % ration received (4)	% families receiving ration as planned (4)	Type of commodity checked (5)
		OK	Failed	OK	Failed			
Camp 2	0	0	0	20	0	101	100	rice
Camp 3	0	0	0	0	0	101	95	rice
Camp 5	9	3	0	20	0	101	95	rice
Mae Kong Kha	0	0	3	0	0	100	100	beans
Mae Ra Ma Luang	0	2	0	0	2	96	75	beans
Mae La	0	25	0	12	0	101	80	beans
Umpiem Mai	0	33	0	0	0	99	100	rice
Nu Po	0	10	0	0	0	101	100	beans
Tham Hin	36	0	0	36	0	98	90	rice
Ban Don Yang	0	19	0	0	0	102	80	beans
<b>Total:</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>91.5</b>	

(1) Rice sacks rejected are recorded in monthly Camp Supply report forms completed at Godown (Incomplete for this period).

(2) Household visits are recorded as failed if it is clearly established that the family has not received supplies as planned.

(3) Ration books are checked at the distribution points. The check fails if there is any inaccuracy in the number of members of the household or the ration entitlement.

(4) 20 families are selected at random at the distribution point and their ration weighed and checked against their entitlement. The % of families receiving rations as planned is the % receiving within + or -10% of their entitlement.

(5) One major commodity is checked.

Samples taken were small during this period and were incomplete, but generally indicated that the distributions were made as planned. During this next period new Field Assistants are being recruited and will be trained in this work. Sample rates and coverage will be higher but full sampling will not be available until the beginning of 2003.

New 'Supply Receipt and Distribution Forms' are now also being used in the camps. These forms will record overall distribution levels compared with the calculated ration entitlement of the population as a whole, the 'distribution accuracy rating'. Summary statistics should be available in the next six-month period.

#### **t) Indicators**

Since the 2000 Oslo Donors meeting, BBC has been committed to developing Performance Indicators to assess the achievement of the programme objectives. It was recognised that producing indicators to measure all aspects of BBC programme would take some time and during the first half of 2001 a logframe was developed to establish priority indicators for initial attention. These were to measure the achievement of BBC's main objective of ensuring that the displaced persons receive adequate availability and access to food to sustain life. Data collection procedures were set up and all of these indicators will be available during 2002. Results so far are set out in Section 4.

Having established the priority food indicators the Logframe will be extended to include shelter, gender, and refugee participation as the next priorities.

#### **u) Cost Effectiveness**

Although the BBC programme has grown enormously in the last few years, BBC continues to implement its programme as much as possible through the refugee's own committees and employs only 27 staff (including two consultants). Even though this represents a big increase in staff compared with just a few years ago, administrative expenses including all staff, office and vehicle expenses is budgeted to be 5.7% of expenditures in 2002. The total cost of the programme is still only equivalent to about baht 4,000 per refugee per year, or around baht 11 per refugee per day (US 26 cents per day at the current exchange rate of 42 baht/USD).

#### **v) Gender**

The majority of the camp populations arrived as a family unit. Most families have male-headed households and the ratio of male to female is approximately 51:49. The average family size is 5.4. Many village communities either crossed the border at the same time or re-established themselves on arrival in the camps. Thus they have been able to maintain the structural support of their community and often the village head has become a section leader within the camp.

Approximately 6% of households are single female headed households and it is the responsibility of the section leaders to ensure their needs are met during such times as camp relocations, house construction and general repairs.

The refugee and camp committees are responsible for the day-to-day administration of the camps and it is BBC policy to coordinate all activities through these committees. However women are significantly under-represented in these areas and BBC is exploring ways to encourage more involvement by women at different levels through its ongoing work on developing a gender policy.

Women play an active role in community activities such as teachers, health workers, home visitors and laboratory technicians and, although BBC works primarily through the camp committees, it is recognised that the Women's organisations, health workers and teachers play an invaluable role in the community network and are often a focal point for information. The staff make frequent house visits to observe the daily routine of the refugees.

The protection workshops have identified areas of concern in relation to gender and the NGOs now have to work collectively to find solutions and effective measures to address areas of concern.

As described in Section 3 BBC is currently working with a consultant for six months to develop a BBC gender policy. This policy and an initial action plan for implementation will be presented at the 2002 Donors Meeting.

#### **w) Environmental Impact**

The impact of the refugee population on the environment was minimised until the mid-1990s by keeping the camps to the size of small villages. The refugees were not allowed to plant rice although in some areas they could forage in the jungle for roots, vegetables and building materials. The environmental impact of the camps was significant, but relatively minor when compared with the damage caused by rampant illegal logging conducted by other parties in most of the border areas. The creation of larger, consolidated camps since 1995 has placed greater strain on the environment. This has resulted in the need for BBC to supply cooking fuel and building materials as explained under items f) and h). The cooking fuel is made from waste from sawmills, bamboo and coconut by-products and the building materials are usually supplied from commercially grown plots. BBC food supplies are generally delivered in reusable containers, e.g., sacks for rice, mung beans and salt, tins for fish paste and drums for cooking oil.

## **x) Programme Sustainability**

The programme philosophy of maximising refugee input, minimising staff and aid dependency has, with the understanding of the donors, proven sustainable for over 18 years. The refugees have been largely responsible for their own lives and their culture has generally been maintained. Unfortunately more rigid controls on the camps introduced in recent years have now eroded the refugees' sense of self-sufficiency, making them increasingly aid-dependent. Also new demands from Donors for independent control checks threatens to undermine the trust built up with the Refugee Committees and their own sense of responsibility and involvement in administering the assistance programme.

A major objective of the philosophy has been to ensure that the refugees can return home when the situation allows it. It can be argued that even after 18 years most of the refugees would want to go home immediately if the opportunity arose. They would be eager to just get on with their lives. However during recent years Burmese Army campaigns have destroyed hundreds of villages and created large free-fire zones. When the day comes for repatriation there will be a need for a major relief programme, not only for the returning refugees, but also for tens of thousands of internally displaced persons. There will be the need for some strategic planning for the reconstruction and redevelopment of areas laid waste by the SPDC.

Sustainability also depends on the Thai people/authorities tolerance of the refugees' presence. Although there were periods of tension in the past, in general the local population and the Thai authorities were very understanding of the refugees' needs, and tolerant of their presence. Since 1998, however, the economic crisis in Thailand has made the presence of large numbers of refugees and illegal workers a much more sensitive issue with calls for more controls and pressure to reduce numbers. A series of security 'incidents' involving armed Burmese elements, beginning with the armed raid of the Burmese Embassy in October 1999 has made matters even worse. These incidents increased the Thai authorities' concern about security and the problems refugees are perceived to be bringing to Thailand. Since then there has been increasing rhetoric against the refugees, accusing them of environmental damage, bringing in diseases, taking Thai jobs, as well as being involved in crime, prostitution and drug trafficking. In some areas the refugees are made to feel unwelcome and rumours of secret repatriation plans create anxiety in the camps.

Another factor affecting sustainability is BBC's ability to go on raising the necessary funds to cover expenditures. After a period of relatively stability during which increasing programme demands were offset by falling prices, costs are now starting to rise again with a budget increase of 29% for 2003. This will be yet another test for BBC's long serving donors particularly at a time when there is also interest in expanding humanitarian assistance inside Burma.

## **y) Programme Evaluation**

BBC's policy includes a commitment to periodic programme evaluations as a tool for improving the effectiveness of the programme but, since 1994, Donors have requested these and there have been seven to date:

March 1994	Dutch Interchurch Aid/EC/Femconsult. Overall Programme
November 1996	Dutch Interchurch Aid/Femconsult. Monitoring Procedures
April 1997	ECHO Evaluation Report. Overall Programme
November 1997	ECHO Audit. Financial/Administration Procedures
May 1998	Dutch Interchurch Aid/International Agricultural Centre/Supplementary Feeding
April 2000	DanChurchAid/Sphere Project Minimum Standards
May 2000	UNHCR Consultant Study of BBC Cooking Fuel Supplies

The ECHO evaluations in 1997 were carried out independently by their consultants or representatives who observed BBC's activities over a short period of time. The Dutch Interchurch Aid and DanChurchAid supported evaluations though were fully participatory exercises, focussing on issues of interest/concern identified by BBC. The Dutch Interchurch Aid evaluations were progressive, each following up on previous recommendations.

Effectively all of the principle recommendations of the evaluations have now been implemented whilst some issues raised in the 2000 Sphere evaluation are still ongoing.

It is the policy of the BBC to cooperate with any external evaluations required by individual donors and to implement agreed recommendations. ECHO had indicated that they had planned to carry out an evaluation during the first half of 2002 but this did not materialise. The BBC Advisory Committee have recommended that an evaluation be carried out of BBC's management/organisation Structure and this will be discussed at the 2002 Donors Meeting.

## **z) Visibility**

The following visibility policy was adopted at the 2001 BBC Donors Meeting:

“BBC policy is not to display any publicity in the refugee camps. Its vehicles and property are unmarked and generally no Donor publicity such as stickers or signs are posted.

This policy has been observed since the beginning of the programme in 1984. The rationale is:

1. To show mutuality and promote the dignity of the refugees. The Refugee Committees are considered operational partners, sharing responsibility for providing the basic needs of the refugee communities. They are encouraged to be as self-sufficient as possible and it is not considered appropriate to make them display their dependence on outside assistance.
2. BBC has around 40 Donors. It considers that it would be inequitable to display publicity for one/some donors only and impractical to publicise all.

The BBC wishes all Donors to respect this policy. Where contractual practices necessitate publicity Donors will be requested to minimise their expectations and, if possible, to accept non-field publicity.

Whilst other NGOs working on the Thai/Burmese border do not maintain such a strict ‘invisibility’ policy, they nevertheless maintain a low-profile presence. This reflects the original Ministry of Interior mandate, which specified ‘no publicity’.”

## Appendix D/Table D1

## Table D2

## Table D3

## Tables D4, D5

## Appendix E

## **Auditor's Report**

## Assets

## Revenue/Expenses

## Notes

## Note 2

## APPENDIX F

### BBC MEETING SCHEDULE 2002

#### 1. BBC Board Meetings

**Tuesday** 1.30pm, BBC Office, Bangkok:

January	8	July	9
February	12	August	13
March	12	September	10
April	9	October	8
May	7	November	12
June	11	December	10

In accordance with the BBC Structure and Regulations agreed by the Donors Meeting, all Donors have the right to attend Board Meetings as observers.

#### 2. CCSDPT Meetings

The CCSDPT information and coordination Meetings take place every month at the British Club, Soi 18 Silom Road, on the **Wednesday** immediately after the Board Meeting. The schedule is:

January	9	July	10
February	13	August	14
March	13	September	11
April	10	October	9
May	8	November	13
June	12	December	11

0900 – 1100	CCSDPT Open Session (NGOs, IOs, Embassies)
1100 – 1200	CCSDPT Work Session (NGOs only)
1330 – 1530	CCSDPT Health and Education Subcommittees

#### 3. BBC Advisory Committee Meeting/Border Visit

3 – 7 June

#### 4. BBC Donors Meeting

9/10/11 October, Ottawa, Canada.